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Executive Summary 
 
Overview 
 
Pandemic events are unpredictable and inevitable. When they occur, the impact 
is both all-encompassing and asymmetrical; each pandemic targets specific, 
vulnerable populations, but ultimately impacts individuals, families and 
communities throughout the world. Regardless of origin or circumstances, the 
next pandemic will certainly count infants, children, and adolescents among its 
most vulnerable targets. As evidenced by the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, 
children may be at higher risk than populations more typically seen as 
susceptible to pandemic illness (the elderly, those with weakened immune 
systems, etc.).  Children also can function as disease vectors, spreading the 
virus through their ubiquitous presence in settings where they live, attend school, 
and play. 
 
This document is the result of a two-year international, mixed-methods study of 
the physical, social, and mental health effects of pandemic on children and 
families – particularly the impact of quarantine and hospital isolation during these 
events. This project also examined the psychosocial effects of pandemic disaster 
on professionals who care for children before, during, and after pandemic. Based 
on the empirical findings of this study, researchers developed a set of evidence-
informed, child-focused, best practice guidelines for use by stakeholders during 
future pandemics across a variety of relevant fields. In addition, data gathered 
and analyzed for the project have been used to create a set of Kentucky-specific 
recommendations that respond to the state’s unique geographic and population 
needs.  
 
Phases 
 
This project was divided into two phases; the first phase consisted of a 
comprehensive literature review and content analysis with a focus on current 
knowledge relevant to the impact of disease containment strategies on the 
biopsychosocial responses of families and children.1  Following the careful 
examination of literature from the areas of public health, social psychology, 
behavioral health, healthcare, and law, the research team then constructed and 
piloted a “toolkit,” which included a range of surveys, interviews, and focus group 
schedules targeted for key respondents who were determined to have significant 
1 Sprang, G., Clark, J., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., Mohipp, C., Silman, M. & Smith, J. (2009). 
 Best Practices Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: A Social Behavioral 
 Evaluation. A Comprehensive Analysis of Pandemic and Quarantine Responses for 
 Families and Children. Lexington, KY: Center for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
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knowledge of pandemic.2  Coincidentally, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was 
occurring as field work was being planned and initiated, which allowed 
investigators to use the event as a “natural experiment” to learn how authorities 
in the United States (U.S.), Canada, and Mexico worked when faced with a true 
pandemic. 
 
Individuals recruited to participate in the first phase of the project consisted of 
stakeholders and other professionals involved in pandemic planning and 
response: behavioral health professionals, healthcare workers, law and ethics 
experts, and public health officials. Recruitment was conducted through the use 
of multiple marketing and recruitment techniques (e.g., newspaper 
advertisements, flyers, snowball sampling). Data collection efforts also captured 
the experiences of children, youth and parents. Data was collected using a 
“follow the virus” sampling strategy, which focused efforts in the areas most 
impacted by pandemics in Mexico, Canada and the U.S. The information 
gathered was used to construct an expert database that included the 
experiences, knowledge, and description of data collected from a diverse set of 
2,608 experts.3  
 
Following the development and publication of a report on the evidence gathered 
during the data collection phase4, phase one culminated with a preliminary draft 
of evidence-based recommendations to address identified deficits in child-
focused pandemic planning and response.5 These recommendations were then 
subjected to national and international field-testing to determine the utility and 
validity of the guidelines. The feedback phase consisted of three components:  
expert critiques of the overall findings and recommendations; responses from 
Kentucky stakeholders on the utility and relevance of the recommendations for 
state-level implementation; and comments from representatives of national 
professional organizations not previously queried.6 & 7 Special focus was placed 
2 Sprang, G., Clark, J., Jackson, C., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., Mohipp, C., & Silman, M. (2009). 
 University of Kentucky Behavioral Health Research Toolkit: An Analysis of the Child and 
 Family  Experience.  Lexington, KY: Center for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
 
3 Sprang, G., Clark, J., Jackson, C., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., Mohipp, C., & Silman, M. (2010). 
 University of Kentucky Best Practice Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response Expert 
 Database. Lexington, KY: Center for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
 
4 Sprang, G., Clark, J., Jackson, C., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., Mohipp, C., Otis, M., & Silman, M. 
 (2010).  A Comprehensive Analysis of Pandemic and Quarantine Responses for Families 
 and Children: Integrative Report of New Evidence (Preliminary Findings). Lexington, KY: 
 Center for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
 
5 Sprang, G., Clark, J., Jackson, C., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., Mohipp, C., & Silman, M. (2010). 
 New Directions in Pandemic Response: A Roadmap to Resilience. Lexington, KY: Center 
 for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
 
6 Sprang, G., Clark, J., Jackson, C., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., & Silman, M.  (2010). Best Practice 
 Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: Response from the Field (Part 1). 
 Lexington, KY: Center for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
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on the translational utility of the recommendations, so that they would be 
practical in the “real world.” 
 
Evidence-Informed Guidelines 
 
The guidelines are the result of the research team’s data collection and analysis. 
It is the goal of this project to provide pandemic response stakeholders with 
specific, multi-disciplinary recommendations that are family- and child-focused, 
and evidence-informed. The related Public Health Preparedness Guidelines 
(2011)8 are noted for each guideline as appropriate.  The following evidence-
informed guidelines also include links to relevant manuscripts, organizations, and 
resources that may be used to strengthen child-focused pandemic planning and 
response. 
 
 
7 Sprang, G., Clark, J., Jackson, C., LaJoie, A.S., Leigh, P., & Silman, M. (2011). Best Practice 
 Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: Response from the Field (Part 2). 
 Lexington, KY: Center for the Study of Violence Against Children. 
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (March, 2011). Public Health Preparedness 
Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning.  Available at: 
www.cdc.gov/phpr/capabilities. 
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Evidence-Informed Guidelines for Child-Focused  
Pandemic Planning and Response 
 
 
Pandemic Infrastructure Development Strategies 
 
 
1. The National Commission on Children and Disasters (NCCD) has issued a 
report calling for the development of a National Disaster Recovery 
Framework (NDRF) to specifically emphasize the short and long-term 
behavioral health and human recovery needs of children.  The results of 
this study support this recommendation and suggest replication at the 
state and local levels. An additional proviso is that pandemic-specific 
planning and response strategies be included, as pandemics have unique 
features and impacts on children that require discrete but integrated 
efforts.  Pandemic preparedness and response for children and their 
families should be an integral part of an all-hazards approach to 
disaster response and included in the NDRF.  (PHP Capability 1:  
Community Preparedness) 
 
 
2. To facilitate cross-fertilization across disciplines and among 
behavioral health-specific professional organizations, a national 
meeting convened by the NCCD, or another national level group 
interested in children and pandemic preparedness, is advisable.    
This meeting will increase the possibility that innovations, knowledge-
advancements, and progress made by one organization will be shared 
and applied by other groups, thereby standardizing pediatric behavioral 
health practice guidelines and core competencies for providers 
responsible for the behavioral health response to pandemics.  (PHP 
Capability 6:  Information Sharing; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness) 
 
 
3. The creation of a Pediatric Pandemic Clearinghouse would allow 
national planners and responders access to a database of relevant 
knowledge. This clearinghouse could function as an adjunct to or as part 
of the pediatric disaster clearinghouse recommended by the NCCD.  (PHP 
Capability 6: Information Sharing; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness) 
 
 
4. To promote an effective focus on children during disaster planning 
and response, the behavioral health response should be organized 
using a child-focused boundary spanner/boundary spanning team. 
The boundary spanner/boundary spanning team will take an all-hazards 
approach to disaster response while being specifically focused on the 
needs of children and their families.  Although the boundary spanner can 
effectively operate from either Public Health or the Office of Emergency 
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Management, a crucial strategy is to connect these two divisions at the 
federal, state, and local levels to avoid duplication of effort and to promote 
the most effective child-focused planning to build resilient communities 
and systems.  (PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP 
Capability 2: Community Recovery; PHP Capability 6: Information 
Sharing) 
 
 
5. Public health officials should include the perspectives of heretofore 
excluded groups in pandemic planning and response efforts, such 
as parents, children, and vulnerable populations.  Such populations 
may include ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities.  Representatives of 
these groups can be included in the development of risk messaging, and 
in the selection of behavioral health screening tools, and response 
frameworks. Proactive inclusion will increase the likelihood that the needs 
of these populations are attended to with developmentally and culturally 
appropriate services, messages or tools. Inclusion will also enhance 
cooperation with crucial public health approaches, and contribute to the 
well-being of children and families. (PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness; PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing; PHP Capability 2: 
Community Recovery) 
 
 
6. Due to differences in mission and focus between behavioral health 
organizations and public health entities, behavioral health services will not 
be effectively and fully integrated into the pandemic response unless 
prescribed, protocol-driven and collaboratively developed. This is best 
achieved through promoting the efforts of the child-focused boundary 
spanner, the development of a behavioral health module in every 
state pandemic preparedness and response plan, and the active 
involvement of behavioral heath professionals in the process.  (PHP 
Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 2: Community 
Recovery) 
 
 
Essential Elements of the Behavioral Health Module: 
 
i. A clearly defined organizational structure for pediatric pandemic 
planning and response. The mental health response will best be 
organized by using the child-focused pandemic boundary 
spanner/boundary spanning team.  Some state plans addressed 
mental health planning and response by delegating such issues to 
separate departments, or they included action items regarding the 
development of tools and protocols to address mental health 
needs.  While these were steps in the right direction, follow-up and 
maintenance of action items also need to occur to ensure mental 
health services will be readily available for pandemic response in 
the short and long term. State plans should address the 
coordination of mental health providers with emergency 
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preparedness officials to deliver services.  When these 
arrangements are secured, specific attention should be paid to the 
reporting structure, the training and qualification requirements of 
providers, communication pathways to ensure the efficient flow of 
information, and strategies for alternative service delivery.  (PHP 
Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 3: 
Emergency Operations Coordination; PHP Capability 2: Community 
Recovery) 
 
 
ii. Sample messages aimed at decreasing stigma, increasing 
compliance and promoting individual and community resiliency. 
See the Risk Communication section of this document for detailed 
recommendations.  (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public 
Information and Warning; PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing; 
PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness) 
 
 
iii. Psychoeducational materials that explicate normal versus abnormal 
responses of children and parents to pandemics. (For example, fact 
sheets about psychosocial and developmental responses with 
specific attention to vulnerable populations during disasters.) 
Information should be made available to parents via mental health 
hotlines (211 lines were used with success in many communities), 
and disseminated via websites, e-mail, schools, doctors’ offices, 
community centers and other child-focused sites. Examples of 
useful materials that are available in the public domain follow.  
(PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Warning; 
PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing; PHP Capability 7: Mass 
Care; PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness) 
 
 
iv. Plans should specify that assessment and treatment services for 
children and adults be evidence-informed and protocol driven, thus 
allowing local experts to tailor intervention strategies to the needs 
of the community while ensuring consistent, quality service delivery.  
(PHP Capability 7: Mass Care; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness) 
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v. State and/or local pandemic response plans should provide specific 
criteria for when first responders or other emergency management 
personnel should make a behavioral health referral for assessment 
or treatment.  These criteria should be created in conjunction with 
the identified behavioral health organization responsible for 
receiving the referrals to ensure compatibility between the 
established criteria and the admission and acceptance policies of 
the behavioral health agency.  (PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness) 
 
 
vi. A continuum of evidence-informed, child-focused interventions 
ranging from stress prevention and support efforts to long-term 
Pandemic Flu and Pediatric Traumatic Stress Fact Sheets  
 
Pandemic Flu Fact Sheet: A Parents’ Guide to Helping Families Cope 
with a Pandemic Flu 
http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/Pandemic_Flu_Factsheet.
pdf 
 
Influenza Pandémica: Guía de los padres’ para ayudar a las familias a 
enfrentar la Influenza pandémica 
http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/Influenza_pandemica_Fina
l_Spanish_Version0.pdf 
 
Understanding Child Traumatic Stress 
http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/Understanding_Child_Trau
matic_Stress_Brochure_9-29-05.pdf 
 
Developmental Differences in Pediatric Traumatic Stress 
http://www.healthcaretoolbox.org/pdf/Developmental_Differences.pdf 
 
After the Trauma: Helping My Child Cope 
http://www.healthcaretoolbox.org/pdf/After_the_trauma_child.pdf 
 
At the Hospital: Helping my Child Cope With Illness 
http://www.healthcaretoolbox.org/pdf/Hospital_Illness_Child.pdf 
 
At the Hospital: Helping My Teen Cope With Illness 
http://www.healthcaretoolbox.org/pdf/Hospital_Illness_Teen.pdf 
 
After the Hospital: Helping My Child Cope 
http://www.healthcaretoolbox.org/pdf/After_the_hospital_child.pdf 
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trauma-focused psychotherapeutic services should be available in 
each community. The importance of relationship-based 
interventions for young children exposed to pandemic conditions 
should inform all therapeutic services and be included in the 
continuum of available interventions.  (PHP Capability 7: Mass 
Care; PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness)  
 
 
vii. A list of formal and informal community-based resources that can 
address the psychosocial needs of children and families affected by 
the pandemic should be included and regularly updated.  (PHP 
Capability 7: Mass Care; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness) 
 
 
viii. Alternative service delivery options (telemedicine delivery 
mechanisms, online support groups, etc.) for behavioral health 
services in times of quarantine or isolation should be developed 
and required.  Specific advice to practitioners regarding financing 
and privacy implications of these substitute methods should also be 
included in the state pandemic plan.  (PHP Capability 7: Mass 
Care; PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 
2: Community Recovery) 
 
 
ix. Strategies for “just in time” training of behavioral health, public 
health and healthcare workers should be outlined to address staff 
turnover, procedural drift, recertification and the incorporation of 
new innovations.  (PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery; PHP 
Capability 7: Mass Care) 
 
 
x. Plans should include pandemic-specific ethical and legal guidance 
for behavioral health professionals working with children and 
families. The following resource may be useful in providing ethical 
and legal guidance to professionals. (See Appendix I for additional 
ethical and legal resources.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. There are naturally occurring congregate sites (NOCS) in communities 
that are currently used as the default location for the public to obtain 
resources (housing, food, financial aid).  These NOCS should be 
Planning and Responding to Pandemic Influenza:   
Ethical Considerations Checklist 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/phethics/ 
Pan_Flu_Ethics_Checklist.3-15-07.final.doc 
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identified and used to assist communities with resource distribution, 
risk communication and behavioral health screening of children and 
families in a pandemic situation.  Examples of NOCS include libraries, 
community centers, schools, and centers of worship.  Use of these sites 
may reduce stigma associated with accessing pandemic-related medical 
or behavioral healthcare, because they possess high familiarity, high 
accessibility, and provide a range of services for the local population.  
Some proposed criteria for the selection of a congregate site include:  1) it 
should be accessible on foot or by public transit; 2) the site should be 
welcoming to a wide range of people, including those from 
elusive/vulnerable communities; 3) the site should be conducive to 
conducting health and behavioral health interventions with children (e.g., 
can meet safety, privacy, and space needs); 4)  it should be a child-
friendly space; and 5) the site should be socially sanctioned by community 
as a place to gather, interact, communicate, and receive goods and 
services. 
 
2. Faith-based organizations and houses of worship are often important 
components in the critical infrastructure responsible for supporting the 
social fabric of the community. Their experience in dealing with death and 
dying makes these organizations a natural resource for families in 
potentially lethal disasters. Faith-based organizations and houses of 
worship should be included as collaborators in the development of 
pandemic preparedness plans, and they need adequate support and 
training in the peri- and post-pandemic environment.  
 
3. Existing, informal therapeutic relationships (church, school, etc.) 
may be the most realistic avenue for providing support for most 
children, and should be identified and included in resource lists.  In 
addition to regular attendees, even marginally involved members and 
uninvolved persons will appear at houses of worship during crises, 
creating a naturally occurring congregate site.  The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) has produced a document, “H1N1 Flu: A 
Guide to Community and Faith Based Organizations,” in recognition of the 
important role that faith-based or other community organizations may play 
during pandemic disaster. This document may be useful to pandemic 
planning and response officials.  (PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery; 
PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing; PHP Capability 4: Emergency 
Public Information and Warning). 
 
 
H1N1 Flu: A Guide to Community and Faith Based Organizations 
 
This guide may be accessed at: 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/professional/community/cfboguidance.html 
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4. Disaster response, by its nature, is interdisciplinary. Behavioral health 
professional organizations should collaborate and coordinate to 
develop professional standards of care for a pandemic response. 
The following should be addressed when developing standards for 
behavioral health professionals responding to pandemic events: 
 
i. Identification and articulation of the unique roles and responsibilities 
of members in responding to a pandemic (PHP Capability 1: 
Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 3; Emergency 
Operations Coordination; PHP Capability 6: Mass Care); 
 
ii. Guidelines for collaboration and coordination with other professions 
and emergency management personnel (PHP Capability 6: Mass 
Care; PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery); 
 
iii. Specifications of the organizations’ contractual agreements with the 
most appropriate disaster gatekeepers (PHP Capability 3: 
Emergency Operations Coordination); 
 
iv. Recommendations regarding the standard of care for the 
assessment and treatment of children and adults who are suffering 
with behavioral health issues related to the pandemic. This may 
include the adoption of practice guidelines for a broad range of 
pandemic-related health and mental health conditions, including 
those developed by other organizations (PHP Capability 6: Mass 
Care; PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness); 
 
v. Identification of educational, training and practice competencies 
that should be used by universities, professional schools, and 
training programs to develop pre-graduate curriculum and post-
graduate continuing education (PHP Capability 6: Mass Care; PHP 
Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 15: 
Volunteer Management); 
 
vi. Provision of ethical and legal guidance for members on issues 
related to service provision during and after the pandemic crisis 
situation (PHP Capability 3: Emergency Operations Coordination) 
 
vii. Presentation of practical advice in the form of fact sheets or 
checklists for the public that is consistent across professions. (PHP 
Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 4: 
Emergency Public Information and Warning) 
 
 
 
Risk Communication 
 
5. As part of the planning process, culturally-appropriate risk 
communication should be developed that incorporates input from 
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diverse constituencies and includes (PHP Capability 6: Information 
Sharing): 
 
i. Age-appropriate messaging (both in content and method of 
delivery) that accounts for developmental differences in need and 
influence during different phases of childhood and adolescence 
(PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Warning); 
 
ii. Information regarding a child’s normal and abnormal responses to a 
pandemic disaster and available resources from whom parents and 
guardians can seek mental health assistance (PHP Capability 4: 
Emergency Public Information and Warning; PHP Capability 7: 
Mass Care); 
 
iii. Psychoeducational programs targeted at decreasing uncertainty 
and anxiety, as well as increasing self-efficacy in children and their 
family caregivers (PHP Capability 7: Mass Care); 
 
iv. Information about strategies to reduce mental health stress during 
isolation and quarantine (PHP Capability 11: Non-Pharmaceutical 
Interventions); 
 
v. Counter-messaging to dispel myths and misconceptions that lead 
to stigmatizing behavior  (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public 
Information and Warning); and 
 
vi. Information on how to balance work-family responsibilities (e.g., 
legal options, questions to ask employers, community resources to 
provide financial or child care assistance) (PHP Capability 14: 
Responder Safety and Health). 
 
 
6. The inherent tension between physicians’ focus on individual patient care 
and public health’s attention to promoting population health can create 
inconsistent messaging to families and the community.  Such 
inconsistency can unintentionally generate confusion and mistrust.  Public 
health officials should strive to close the gap between the medical 
community and government agencies regarding important issues related 
to pandemic planning and response (i.e., vaccine safety and distribution).  
Pediatric and family medicine healthcare professionals should be 
involved in crafting and disseminating pandemic messaging (along 
with public health) to increase the credibility of the message and the 
consistency of information (PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness; 
PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Warning).   
 
7. It is notable that messages are more likely to be accepted, compliance 
increased, and stigma reduced when trusted community members 
(including promotoras y promotores de salud) are involved in the 
dissemination of information, and when risk communication is 
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broadcast in the individual’s first language.  The utilization of culturally 
specific, age-appropriate, family-accessed communication channels is the 
best way to achieve this goal. Kentucky has developed the Kentucky 
Outreach and Information Network (KOIN) as a way of tapping into 
established, “trusted messengers” of information in disasters.  The 
purpose of the KOIN is to ensure that communication channels are in 
place so that the state’s most vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations 
receive critical health information from people they already know and trust.  
This network coordinates messaging with the Kentucky Department of 
Public Health and disseminates consistent information to vulnerable 
populations (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and 
Warning) 
 
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategies for Behavioral Health Screening, Assessment and Intervention  
 
8. The rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms in parents 
and children indicate that the experience of disease containment created a 
stressful condition that was experienced as traumatic by some study 
respondents.  Individual parents and children who experience quarantine 
or isolation appear to require behavioral health and other support services 
to prevent or mitigate the traumatic effects of such experiences. Routine 
peri- and post-pandemic behavioral health assessment that includes 
trauma screening is indicated for parents and youth who experience 
isolation or quarantine (PHP Capability 7: Mass Care).  
 
 
9. Positive identification of PTSD in individuals indicates the need for 
an automatic assessment for the presence of behavioral health 
disorders in those individuals’ family members.  Data from this study 
found that concurrent elevations in behavioral health stress symptoms in 
children and parents in the same family were not unusual (PHP Capability 
7: Mass Care). 
 
10. Children and families experiencing isolation and quarantine should 
be screened for anxiety-related symptoms as part of routine 
healthcare services (PHP Capability 11: Non-Pharmaceutical 
Interventions).  Characteristics of integrated health/behavioral healthcare 
include: 
 
i. Use of pediatric healthcare providers to conduct behavioral health 
screenings during pandemic-related medical visits.  Because mass 
congregate sites are unusual in pandemic events, screening should 
Information about the KOIN is available at:  
http://healthalerts.ky.gov/koin/Pages/default.aspx 
 13 
 
 
 
occur during pandemic-related medical diagnosis, vaccination, 
quarantine and isolation. Screenings may need to be conducted 
again at follow-up contact, particularly after quarantine or isolation 
(PHP Capability 11: Mass Care; PHP Capability 4:  Emergency 
Public Information and Warning).   
 
ii. Brief, empirically informed, behavioral health screening as part of 
the routine assessment of pandemic symptoms. Self-report tools 
may be most efficient and should focus on anxiety. Examples of 
brief, standardized instruments with good psychometric properties 
are included as Appendix H.  (PHP Capability 7: Mass Care) 
 
iii. Consideration of issues of culture, development, language and 
literacy to ensure screening tools have maximum utility and validity.  
(PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 7: 
Mass Care). 
 
 
11. Behavioral health interventions can and should be delivered 
effectively using alternative delivery media such as telemedicine and 
online support groups to facilitate connections among patients, families 
and friends who are isolated. During the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) pandemic, an online support group based in Canada 
proved to be a supportive and educational intervention for quarantined 
and isolated individuals (PHP Capability 2: Community recovery; PHP 
Capability 7: Mass Care). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Screening and assessment results should be linked to ongoing, 
integrated service provision by behavioral health professionals trained 
in evidence-based protocols.  Five essential elements of immediate and 
mid-term intervention that are supported by empirical evidence include the 
following activities (PHP Capability 7: Mass Care): 
 
i. Promote a sense of safety and well-being. In pandemic situations, 
this requires adequate and timely medical intervention, protection from 
exposure, contagion and secondary loss, and disease containment 
(PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Warning; PHP 
Capability 6: Information Sharing);. 
  
SARS Support Centre 
 
The SARS online support group used in Canada is a good model of how to 
provide ongoing support for those experiencing stress due to a pandemic in 
a non-stigmatizing and disease-conscious manner. 
http://www.sarssupportcentre.net/ 
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ii. Promote calming. Messaging should avoid unnecessary catastrophic 
language, opportunities for action and self-care should be clearly 
articulated, and strategies to promote family togetherness and 
resiliency should be implemented to capitalize on existing adaptive 
skills (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Sharing). 
 
iii. Promote a sense of self and collective efficacy. Effective decision-
making and resiliency in pandemic conditions requires the acquisition 
of accurate and appropriate information, opportunities for self-directed 
action, choice, and good communication with public health officials, 
healthcare providers and behavioral health professionals (PHP 
Capability 7: Mass Care). 
 
iv. Promote connectedness.  Family-centered care that maintains the 
protective qualities of the parent-child relationship in quarantine or 
isolation situations is preferable.  The use of social media and 
telecommunication strategies should be implemented to promote social 
connectedness in times of isolation, shelter-in-place or quarantine 
(PHP Capability 11: Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions). 
 
v. Promote hope.  Projected fatality rates and proposed risk profiles 
should be tempered and accompanied by concrete health and mental 
health promotion strategies and activities to prevent panic and despair.  
Existing individual and community strengths and resiliency should be 
identified and highlighted in media coverage of the pandemic event 
(PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Warning; PHP 
Capability 6: Information Sharing). 
 
   
13. Behavioral health organizations should have in place clearly outlined 
and pre-determined behavioral health strategies and methods to 
screen persons who have been exposed to pandemic and who may be 
in need of mental health services. (See Appendix H, Recommendations 
for Brief Screening Tools.)  (PHP Capability Community Preparedness; 
PHP Capability 7: Mass Care). 
 
 
14. Behavioral health organizations should provide training for their 
employees who may be potential pandemic responders.  This training 
should be tested and updated regularly to keep pace with innovations in 
the field, and should promote the following: 
 
For children needing therapeutic services for trauma-related disorders, 
trauma-informed, evidence-based protocols are needed.  For a complete 
listing of best practices for the treatment of traumatic stress, see 
http://www.nctsn.org 
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i. Understanding and implementation of strategies to prevent 
adverse mental health responses to pandemic (PHP Capability 
1:  Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 7: Mass Care); 
 
ii. Competency in the use of evidence-informed, child- and 
pandemic-focused screening and intervention tools, with 
attention to the phase of the pandemic (PHP Capability 7: Mass 
Care); 
 
iii. Understanding of risk and protective factors for children and 
caretakers during pandemic disaster (PHP Capability 1: 
Community Preparedness); 
 
iv. Use of trauma framework for understanding a child’s and 
parent’s response to disease containment, and appropriate 
interventions that can be used to address trauma-related 
conditions (PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness); 
 
v. Guidance on ethical decision-making in times of disasters (PHP 
Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 7: Mass 
Care); 
 
vi. Strategies for self-care (PHP Capability 14: responder Safety 
and Well-Being); 
 
vii. Opportunities and methods for collaborating effectively with 
public health, and strategies for utilizing and financing 
alternative service delivery options. Telemedicine or 
videoconferencing services that include interactive features 
between clients and providers are most likely to be fundable 
therapeutic encounters.  
 
 
 
Strategies for Building Resilience in Youth, Families and Communities  
 
 
21. Results of this study indicate little awareness on the part of education or 
public health officials of government food subsidies available to districts 
that experience school closures of five days or more due to pandemic 
crisis.  To prevent a disruption of food supply to children who qualify for 
free or reduced school meals, further training and education on the 
benefits available through the Pandemic Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (P-SNAP) is indicated (PHP Capability 1: 
Community Preparedness; PHP Capability 2: Community recovery; PHP 
Capability 6: Information Sharing).   
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22. In the event the P-SNAP program is utilized, issues of getting the food 
supply to children who are dependent upon the free or reduced school 
lunch program have not been addressed in most districts.  A food 
distribution plan should be developed that provides for three-deep 
workforce coverage in the event of school closures that exceed five 
days.  This plan should be able to accommodate worker illness or 
unavailability, and to ensure that children can access the food supply 
subsidized by the P-SNAP benefit (PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness).  
 
 
 
 
 
Strategies for Healthcare Organizations 
 
 
23. During a pandemic crisis, there is potential for caregivers and children to 
be separated in the hospital environment, causing distress and increased 
potential for parental non-compliance with medical orders for isolation and 
segregation. Pandemic care in hospital settings should maintain and 
support child-focused and family-centered care practices throughout 
pandemic response (e.g., allowing parents to remain with children, 
considering family quarantine rather than individual isolation) (PHP 
Capability 7: Mass Care).  
 
 
24. The continuation of pediatric-specific and family-centered care requires 
training sufficient numbers of child-focused professionals and first 
Masters of Disaster 
 
The American Red Cross’ “Masters of Disaster” curriculum was frequently 
mentioned as an important school-based program that prepared children to deal with 
disasters.  However, it is not pandemic focused.   
 
Information about Masters of Disaster may be found at: 
http://www.redcross.org/disaster/masters/ 
 
 
Tips for Talking to Children After a Disaster:  
A Guide for Parents and Teachers 
 
SAMHSA offers a fact sheet for parents and teachers with guidance on helping 
children after traumatic events. 
 
This material may be accessed at: 
http://www.samhsa.gov/MentalHealth/Tips_Talking_to_Children_After_Disaster.pdf 
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responders to provide uninterrupted, pediatric-specific services during all 
phases of a pandemic. Certain pediatric service areas are highly 
specialized and have been demonstrated to be especially vulnerable to 
workforce loss during a pandemic (e.g., NICU/PICU).  Advanced cross-
training and three-deep coverage needs to be in place to ensure 
continuity of pediatric care during pandemic conditions (PHP 
Capability 15:  Volunteer Management; PHP Capability 1:  Community 
Preparedness).   
 
 
25. The current library of pandemic simulation exercises and drills focus on 
general healthcare and public health responses to widespread disease. It 
is recommended that drills to test pediatric disaster preparedness, 
workforce coverage plans, and behavioral health readiness in 
pandemic crisis be developed and updated and utilized annually 
(PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness). 
 
 
 
 
 
26. All healthcare professionals and related support personnel need timely, 
accurate, current, and authoritative information before, during, and after a 
pandemic. The child-focused boundary spanner could be particularly 
effective in disseminating this information to professionals.  A “push” 
mode of information dissemination to healthcare providers should 
be used to ensure maximum child-focused pandemic literacy (i.e., 
information is received automatically via e-mail or phone alert, which does 
not require any personal initiative or action to retrieve it). (PHP Capability 
6: Information Sharing). 
 
 
27. Data gathered during this study revealed that during recent pandemics, 
inconsistent disease control strategies were communicated across 
different government agencies. For example, during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and the CDC differed in their recommendations regarding the 
 
Influenza Drill and Simulation Digital Resource 
 
“The Influenza Training Digital Library was created in response to a need for 
a common repository of standardized material involving multiple and diverse 
international partners involved in the delivery of influenza and pandemic 
preparedness training.  This library provides up-to-date, peer-reviewed and 
easy accessible influenza-related training material and technical background 
documents.”  
Additional information may be found at: 
http://influenzatraining.org 
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most appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to use for adults 
and children.  This created confusion and mistrust among healthcare 
providers and the parents of infected children. Therefore, organizations 
should be transparent about inconsistencies in healthcare practices 
and public health recommendations and provide a clear rationale for 
divergence from these guidelines to maximize parental trust and 
cooperation (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and 
Warning; PHP Capability 7: Mass Care). 
 
 
28. Based on the findings of this study, professionals at particular risk for 
traumatic stress responses to pandemic include: a) those who themselves 
were infected or who had family members who were ill; b) those who 
experienced a high number of fatalities in their professional and/or 
personal spheres; c) those who do not normally work with infectious 
disease, isolation or life-threatening illness and during the pandemic 
response were shifted into that role; and d) behavioral health 
professionals who worked with persons affected by isolation and 
quarantine procedures. Therefore, healthcare workers with direct or 
indirect exposure to traumatic events should be screened for secondary 
traumatic stress as a routine part of an organization’s pandemic response 
(PHP Capability 14: Responder Safety and Health). 
 
A. Proposed characteristics of behavioral health screening and  
intervention of healthcare workers include:  
 
i. Behavioral health screening and intervention should be 
available in a confidential and supportive manner to minimize 
potential for stigmatization of professionals requiring or 
accessing such services (PHP Capability 14: Responder Safety 
and Health).;  
 
ii. Behavioral health screening should include recurrent 
opportunities for self-screening, peer assessment and 
supervisory assessment (PHP Capability 14: Responder Safety 
and Health).;  
 
iii. Behavioral health screening should be available during and after 
a pandemic; the post-pandemic period may be the most critical 
(PHP Capability 14: Responder Safety and Health).;  
 
iv. Follow-up services should include both screening for persistent 
mental health distress in the areas of depression and anxiety, 
as well as compassion fatigue/secondary traumatic stress (PHP 
Capability 14: Responder Safety and Health; PHP Capability 2: 
Community Recovery)..  
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30. Organizations should provide access to a range of interventions to 
address the deleterious effects of secondary traumatic stress. The 
possibilities range from preventative, group approaches to individualized, 
psychotherapeutic services. Our field work revealed that informal, 
supportive, and spontaneous gatherings were utilized more frequently 
than mandatory, formal interventions in the immediate aftermath of a crisis 
event (e.g., death of a child) (PHP Capability 14: Responder Safety and 
Health). 
 
 
Continuum of Interventions to Prevent and Address 
Secondary Traumatic Stress in Professionals 
 
[INSERT TABLE HERE} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal and Ethical Considerations  
 
31. If government restricts a citizen’s liberty (via isolation or other disease 
containment measures), it must provide opportunities or resources to 
address the effects of that restriction. For example, if government creates 
criminal sanctions for violation of compulsory quarantine, then government 
must provide the resources for families and children to mitigate the effects 
of those restrictions (e.g., food, income replacement). Jurisdictions should 
review their public health policies and statutes to identify possible 
violations of due process that create unintended effects, such as 
criminalizing family survival behaviors (e.g., breaking isolation/quarantine 
to maintain employment), and resolve these conflicts. The CDC’s Social 
Distancing Law Project may be an example of how this could occur; 
however, only limited information about this project is available in the 
public domain (PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness; PHP 
Capability 11: Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions). 
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32. Courts that serve families and children (e.g., Family Court, 
Dependency Court, Juvenile Court) should take independent actions 
to ensure that key personnel have contact information for all court 
involved personnel so that a coordinated and effective pandemic 
response can be executed. Professional personnel include judges, state 
attorneys, guardians ad litem, and court-appointed advocates, while other 
essential persons include foster parents and social services workers. Such 
pandemic preparedness may require funding for training, education and 
practice exercises for judges, court administrators, and other court 
personnel. The child-focused boundary spanner could assist jurisdictions’ 
efforts through developing collaborations with the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges and other relevant organizations. (PHP 
Capability 6: Information Sharing; PHP Capability 3: Emergency 
Operations Coordination; PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. Key decision makers, such as state, city and public health officials, 
should have training in ethical decision-making to assist children and 
families in crisis as a dimension of pandemic preparedness. Public 
health and/or national security funding should be dedicated to developing 
this skill set in officials and employees in systematic ways. The CDC’s 
“Ethical Considerations Checklist” provides one viable starting point for 
exploration and discussion.  (See Appendix I for additional ethical and legal 
resources.) (PHP Capability 7: Mass Care; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness). 
 
The Social Distancing Law Project  
www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/sdlp/ 
 
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/ 
 
Emergency Preparedness in Dependency Courts: Ten Questions That 
Courts Serving Abused and Neglected Children Must Address 
http://www.icmeducation.org/katrina/chapter2.html  
 
Guidelines for Pandemic Emergency Preparedness Planning: 
A Road Map for Courts 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/Judiciary%20-
%20BJA%20Road%20Map%20for%20Courts.pdf 
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34. Behavioral health professionals may be called upon or feel morally 
compelled to provide professional services across state lines, including 
states where they do not hold a license. Some jurisdictions have passed 
legislation waiving such licensure and liability claims as a way to 
i ncentivize behavioral professionals’ participation in disaster response, 
especially in areas that suffer from shortages of these professionals. State 
governments should consider implementing “Good Samaritan” 
measures in their jurisdictions to provide maximum flexibility to 
behavioral health professionals who want to assist children and 
families in pandemic situations.  (PHP Capability 15: Volunteer 
Management; PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing; PHP Capability 3: 
Emergency Operations Coordination; PHP Capability 2: Community 
Recovery) 
 
 
35. During H1N1, healthcare labor organizations filed lawsuits to contest 
employer-mandated vaccination policies. During SARS, workplace 
mandates penalized infected and ill employees who were unable to 
return to work in a timely manner. To limit workplace conflicts that 
compromise care for children and families, a pandemic-related 
federal agency should convene a meeting to expand local solution 
options from dichotomous, adversarial positions to a broad menu 
of pragmatic approaches. The CDC or National Academies might be 
the appropriate group to convene this meeting.  (PHP Capability 6: 
Information Sharing; PHP Capability 3: Emergency Operations 
Coordination; PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery) 
 
 
 
Considerations for Pandemic Planning in Kentucky  
 
30. Primary care providers deliver pediatric healthcare in many rural 
communities across the nation. However, there is a shortage of primary 
care providers in some areas of Kentucky, and some families get primary 
healthcare from emergency departments. Behavioral health screening 
protocols will need to be disseminated to these healthcare delivery 
settings, and they should be treated as defacto pediatric primary 
care sites (PHP Capability 7: Mass Care; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness). 
 
Planning and Responding to Pandemic Influenza: 
Ethical Considerations Checklist 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/phethics/Pan_Flu_Ethics
_Checklist.3-15-07.final.doc  
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37. In many Kentucky communities, internet services are either unavailable or 
unreliable. Phone trees were identified as a viable mode of 
communication in crisis situations and may be a preferred method 
for pandemic risk communication message delivery to families and 
children living in rural areas. Organizations like the Kentucky Outreach 
and Information Network (KOIN) are recommended because they identify 
methods of risk communication for vulnerable populations that are specific 
to their unique needs (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information 
and Warning; PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing). 
 
 
38. Synchronous service delivery via telemedicine services is a 
reimbursable alternative in pandemic situations in Kentucky by all 
private insurers and should be utilized during periods of pandemic 
and social distancing to ensure continuity of behavioral healthcare. 
The Kentucky Department of Insurance policy language is quite broad and 
states “a health benefit plan shall not exclude a service from coverage 
solely because the service is provided through telehealth and not provided 
through a face to face consultation if the consultation is provided through 
the telehealth network established under KRS 194A.125” (KRS 304.17A-
138, p. 1). This legislation mandates that behavioral health telemedicine 
encounters be reimbursable by Kentucky’s private, third-party providers, 
and allows that services can be delivered by a larger pool of qualified 
behavioral health professionals than what is provided in the Medicaid 
regulation. These approved providers include: psychologists, 
psychological associates, licensed clinical social workers, psychiatric 
nurse practitioners, marriage and family therapists, and psychiatrists. All of 
these provisions are based on the following definition of telehealth 
services “use of interactive audio, video, or other electronic media to 
deliver healthcare” (KRS 45A. 605, p.29). This means that store and 
forward technologies or audio-only applications (i.e., phone counseling) 
are disallowed as reimbursable encounters and would not be viable 
alternative service delivery methods.  (PHP Capability 4: Emergency 
Public Information and Warning; PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing). 
 
 
39. In Kentucky, current Medicaid regulations list behavioral health evaluation 
and consultation services delivered via telemedicine as a covered 
expense if provided by a physician, nurse practitioner, physician’s 
assistant or community mental health center (required provider credentials 
not specified; 907 KAR 3:170). Furthermore, the majority of behavioral 
health services delivered at community mental health centers are NOT 
provided by medical personnel. For this benefit to be adequately realized, 
delineation of the required credentials of providers in community-based 
centers should be developed. Since the majority of behavioral health 
services are provided by non-physicians, this stipulation will limit the use 
of other professionals in a pandemic unless an emergency regulation was 
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executed to amend this order. The regulation states “for a member under 
the age of 21 years…individual psychotherapy CPT codes 90804 through 
90809 may be billed as a telehealth service if provided by a psychiatrist” 
(907 KAR 3:170, p. 2). The reality in Kentucky and most states is that 
psychiatrists focus primarily on psychopharmacology and the majority of 
behavioral health services are delivered by other disciplines. A policy that 
qualifies an expanded list of providers (disciplines other than 
psychiatry) for reimbursable service delivery in times of pandemic 
crisis should be developed so that needed behavioral health services 
can be delivered to low-income children and families in a manner 
consistent with private health insurance procedures in Kentucky 
(PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery; PHP Capability 7: Mass Care; 
Capability 1: Community Preparedness).  
 
 
40. In Kentucky, school-based Family Resource and Youth Service 
Centers (FRYSCs) provide psychosocial and material assistance to 
at-risk families. FRYSCs may be important partners in pandemic 
planning and response in Kentucky, but are currently underutilized 
in these efforts. According to the results of this field work, it appears that 
they are underutilized in disaster plans, but are eager to partner with 
others to address the needs of their constituencies. In other parts of the 
country the FRYSC model may not exist, but there are other entities that 
can be utilized in a similar manner PHP Capability 6: Information Sharing; 
PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public Information and Sharing).  
 
 
41. Kentucky borders seven other states; this creates inter-jurisdictional 
issues regarding coordination in border regions and for populations that 
move back and forth across state borders. These seven states differ 
culturally from one another and from Kentucky, making coordination 
difficult. Kentucky responses should consider the impact of these states 
on the planning and response of bordering Kentucky counties. These 
types of interjurisdictional differences are evident between other state and 
at national borders.  Interjurisdictional differences require 
coordination with adjacent state and national pandemic planning 
authorities on issues related to school closure procedures, vaccine 
distribution approaches, designation of vulnerable populations, 
consistency of risk communication, social distancing measures, 
professional licensure and credentialing, and insurance 
reimbursement policies regarding alternative service delivery (PHP 
Capability 3: emergency Operations Coordination; PHP Capability 4: 
Emergency Public Information and Warning; PHP Capability 15: Volunteer 
Management; PHP Capability 1: Community Preparedness) .  
 
 
42. The Kentucky Chamber of Commerce has been active in H1N1 planning 
and response, and has participated in other health activities sponsored by 
the Kentucky Department of Public Health.  Long-term anticipation of a 
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pandemic is quite difficult for business leaders who have immediate and 
short-term planning considerations as priorities.  Bringing businesses on 
board for pandemic planning will require very clear and persuasive 
planning materials, including specific economic models that convince 
business leaders to see the importance of participating in pandemic 
planning and response.  Incentivizing businesses to create family-
friendly pandemic preparedness planning might include strategies 
such as federal or state tax credits, assistance with federal or state 
employment law compliance, or special recognition for proactive 
contributions to pandemic response.  The following are examples of 
successful strategies utilized around the country that could be replicated 
PHP Capability 2: Community Recovery; PHP Capability 1: Community 
Preparedness) 
. 
Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist 
To assist businesses in pandemic planning with an emphasis on protecting employees’ 
health and safety, as well as limiting the negative impact to the economy and society, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CDC have developed a 
checklist. It identifies important, specific activities large businesses can do to prepare. 
http://www.flu.gov/professional/business/businesschecklist.html 
 
Business Not As Usual: Preparing for a Pandemic Flu 
Public Health – Seattle and King County (Washington) have downloadable resources to 
facilitate business and government preparedness.  Topics include: 
• Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist 
• Continuity of government issues that should be addressed by local agencies 
• “It's Not Flu As Usual” Brochure 
• Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for an Influenza Pandemic 
• Preventing the Spread of Influenza 
• Guidance for employers on returning to work after influenza illness 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/preparedness/pandemicflu/video.aspx 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Operations Plan 
Pandemic Influenza Plan Annex Volume VI (2009) 
The Virginia Emergency Operations Pandemic Influenza Plan (Volume VI) states that the 
Virginia Employment Commission will “assist private-sector workers who may lose jobs or 
be unable to work” because they are ill or a family member is ill and they need to stay 
home to care for them. Families who experience pandemic-related financial instability may 
access emergency unemployment benefits, receive information on employment services, 
crisis counseling or referral, and resource brokering. 
http://www.vaemergency.com/sites/default/files/COVEOPVolumeVIPanFluPlanSeptember2
007Version91609.pdf 
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43. Kentucky is unique in sustainability and duration of public health 
leadership. The Commissioner of Public Health has been in his job for 
many years, as have many other top agency leaders. This is unique 
nationally, and this stability provides for the continuity of processes and 
follow-through on innovations. Public health leaders also happen to be 
pediatricians, and this provides for more sensitivity toward children. Based 
on the high rates of turnover in public health leadership in the U.S., it is 
especially important to ensure child-specific knowledge and 
practices are institutionalized for pandemic and disaster response 
planning in the event of public health leadership changes (PHP 
Capability 6: Information Sharing).. 
 
 
44. Kentucky Educational Television (KET) provides a statewide footprint for 
risk communication messaging and pandemic response directions. This 
statewide media coverage allows for greater ease in disseminating 
consistent messages. Similarly, there are only two major newspapers that 
cover most of the state, so print messaging can be consistent.  KET, the 
Lexington Herald-Leader and the Louisville Courier-Journal should 
be utilized fully in all pandemic communications, and representatives 
from these organizations should be included in planning and 
response efforts.  This would ensure that they are fully briefed in current 
pandemic strategies at all times (PHP Capability 4: Emergency Public 
Information and Warning; HP Capability 6: Information Sharing). 
 
 
45. Kentucky has developed a bench book for judges, “Public Health 
Law Judicial Reference Guide for Kentucky Courts,” that addresses 
public health law during a disaster or pandemic that should be 
integrated into judicial education programs (PHP Capability 3: 
Emergency Operations Coordination).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Health Law Judicial Reference Guide  
For Kentucky Courts 
 http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/KY%20Benchbook-Final.pdf 
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Project Background and Methods 
 
Summary of Project Activities  
 
Evidence-Informed Guidelines for Child-Focused Pandemic Planning and 
Response is the result of an extensive and systematic investigation into the 
impact of pandemic events, particularly disease containment strategies, with 
regard to children and their families.  This exploration examined the psychosocial 
effects of pandemic events on children, families and the professionals who care 
for them before, during and after these events.  These evidence-informed 
guidelines include data from the extant literature, experiences and observations 
of professionals, parents, and youth, and a review of relevant documents.   
 
The significance of this work has become clear in the aftermath of the recent 
H1N1 pandemic.  Although the overall effects of this outbreak were limited, it 
provides a cautionary lesson, as noted by World Health Organization (WHO) 
Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan (2010): 
 
This pandemic has turned out to be much more 
fortunate than what we feared a little over a year ago. 
This time around, we have been aided by pure good 
luck….Had things gone wrong in any of these areas, 
we would be in a very different situation today.  
 
Worldwide, the WHO estimates that 18,449 people died from laboratory 
confirmed pandemic H1N1 infections, but the true death toll is thought to be 
much higher because most victims were probably never officially tested. Further, 
the Writing Committee of the WHO Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza concluded their summary of “lessons learned” with 
humility equal to the Director-General’s:  
 
A large amount of information about the natural history 
and clinical management of 2009 H1N1 virus infection 
has been obtained in a remarkably short period of time, 
but considerable gaps remain. The uncertain evolution of 
this virus among humans and potentially other species 
highlights the need for continued virologic surveillance… 
[P]ublic health efforts to reduce risk factors and to identify 
at-risk populations for the purpose of providing 
immunizations and early care, including the use of 
antiviral drugs, should focus on social as well as clinical 
factors (emphasis added). (WHO Writing Committee, 
2010, p. 1708). 
 
Although pandemic is not new to the U.S. or other populations, each pandemic 
presents novel characteristics that require immediate but flexible public health 
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responses.  The CDC has developed one model of the next avian influenza 
outbreak, estimating 89,000-207,000 American fatalities and 47 million additional 
illnesses with direct (illness- related) costs of $71-$416 billion.  The nature of the 
virus will determine the most vulnerable population groups, but infants, children, 
and adolescents are likely to be among the most affected.  These child victims 
may also prove to be powerful disease vectors, spreading the virus through their 
ubiquitous presence in daycares, schools, hospitals, and in other settings where 
they live, attend school, and play.  Efforts to contain the spread of future 
pandemics are likely to include confinement techniques, including patient 
isolation and quarantine. Although the terms “quarantine” and “patient isolation” 
are used interchangeably in much of the literature, they actually represent distinct 
concepts, and in application, may prompt differential emotional responses in 
those affected.   Patient isolation – the separation of individuals who are known 
to have a specific disease – is a less drastic alternative to quarantine, which 
refers to isolating and restricting the movement of people who are not yet ill, but 
have been exposed or are at risk of exposure to an infectious agent.  Exploration 
and understanding of the biopsychosocial effects of quarantine and patient 
isolation in the context of pandemic disease confinement is important for 
understanding the types of supportive interventions that may be necessary to 
prevent and address the negative responses to forced confinement or isolation.   
 
The renowned twentieth-century sociologist Robert K. Merton (1936) anticipated 
the manifest and latent challenges that modernity, urbanization, and exploding 
technological advances would present to policy makers and social planners, 
especially those operating in democratic nations.  According to Merton, the 
explicit and rational are only part of a more complex context generated by social 
problems under consideration, for a whole host of unpleasant reasons. He warns 
those planning to tackle immense public problems that well-intended policies and 
plans inevitably generate unintended consequences because: (1) leaders are 
under great pressure to act decisively and swiftly with limited understanding of 
the problems to which they are responding, including limited knowledge of the 
nature and extent of resources at hand; (2) error is an unavoidable component of 
all social action and errors specific to rational planning are often discoverable 
only after plans are implemented; and (3) planners’ rational strategies are more 
likely to address the desired, proximate outcomes of their actions — the usual 
definition and structure of a plan — and this focus will usually exclude significant 
attention to the desirable or undesirable remote outcomes that cascade from 
those actions and proximate outcomes.   
 
When we consider pandemic preparedness planning, it is not difficult to gauge 
the relevance of Merton’s analysis.  The failure to rigorously anticipate and 
address probable or foreseeable outcomes of pandemic response plans may 
significantly undermine the overall implementation and effectiveness of any 
containment strategy.  Social distancing strategies and mandated confinements 
such as isolation and quarantine, which are designed to contain disease 
transmission, might instead create unanticipated and additional problems for the 
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persons who are confined, their families, and the public.  Canada’s experience 
with SARS pandemic is instructive regarding the unanticipated consequences for 
policies and practices for families and children.  The WHO’s emphasis on the 
powerful, but only partially understood, set of social factors that shape the 
effectiveness of pandemic response as well as the dire predictions of future 
potential influenza pandemics by the CDC provide a powerful argument for the 
serious consideration of Merton’s cautionary approach.  This project has 
explored the obvious and nuanced, anticipated and unanticipated, expected and 
capricious responses of children and families to pandemic to develop these 
Evidence-Informed Guidelines to assist planners in preparing for and responding 
to future pandemics.   
 
Project Assumptions and Principles  
 
Evidence-informed guidelines for child-focused pandemic planning and response 
must be deemed beneficial to both professionals and the constituents they will 
impact. Evidence-informed guidelines must have translational utility in the “real 
world” (e.g., be practical and realistic for implementation).  Thus, translational 
utility is paramount.   
 
Coincidentally, the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic was occurring as field work was 
being planned and initiated.  The pandemic served as a “natural experiment,” in 
that it allowed the investigators to discover how preparedness and planning 
approaches developed in the U.S., Canada and Mexico actually worked when 
faced with a true pandemic.   
 
Both the exploratory nature of the research and the development of the H1N1 
pandemic required that all aspects of the project be necessarily flexible and 
iterative to maximize ecological validity and translational utility.  The project was 
also necessarily democratic and inclusive:  all members of the research team 
were expected and encouraged to contribute ideas and feedback to the group.   
 
To ensure the project achieved translational utility and maximized ecological 
validity, the following assumptions guided all aspects of the research and 
analysis: 
 
1. Activities were designed and tools developed, enhanced and/or discarded 
according to: (a) their relevance to the goals of the grant; (b) their 
focus on children and families; (c) implications for the behavioral 
health dimensions of quarantine and isolation; and (d) feasibility, 
including state of the science, project team capacities, and perceived 
availability of sample.  
 
2. A “follow the virus” method was utilized. The 2009-2010 H1N1 
pandemic occurred just as the research team was planning and beginning 
the fieldwork for the project.  This provided a unique opportunity to use it 
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as a naturally occurring experiment to study and understand pandemic 
planning and response.   A “follow the virus” sampling strategy was 
developed to do so:  the team used a map of the northern hemisphere to 
catalogue a wide range of pandemic events so that experience-close and 
experience-distant locations could be identified and selected. U.S. sites 
were included that had the highest rates of H1N1 confirmed cases 
pediatric deaths, and overall deaths attributable to influenza-like illness as 
of December 12, 2009.  Additionally,  Mexico was selected because this 
was the epicenter of the initial H1N1 outbreak, and Toronto, Canada was 
included as a study site due to the significant SARS outbreak experienced 
in that city in 2003.   
 
3. Efforts were made to maximize ecological validity.  No a priori 
assumptions were made about who would ultimately be in a sampling 
group. By using this sampling scheme, locations were selected based on 
the intensity of the pandemic experience. Due to the variations in each 
locale (based on culture, standards of practice, and symptom expression), 
samples were defined so as to maximize ecological validity. Therefore, 
local knowledge and practices took precedence over global definitions of 
population subgroups.  
 
4. Geographic distribution was desirable.  A concerted effort was made to 
recognize the distinguishing factors of a variety of environments to identify 
areas of convergence and divergence. The variety of geographic 
environments included rural, suburban and urban, different parts of the 
country, different parts of Kentucky, and a range of natural environments 
influencing culture (mountains, delta, farmlands, etc.).  
 
5. Cultural diversity was desirable.  To identify the essential core elements 
of evidence-informed guidelines, the common requirements of a range of 
populations need to be clearly understood. Key informants and experts 
who could elucidate specific needs of particular populations, as well as 
understand the shared requirements across populations, were targeted.  
 
6. Vulnerable populations must be broadly defined.  Vulnerable 
populations may include communities and populations who are 
disenfranchised by virtue of socioeconomics, ethnicity or race, religion, 
geography, age, or physical, cognitive or emotional disability.  However, 
during pandemic events, other groups are also vulnerable, including 
persons with chronic medical illnesses, infants, children, adolescents, and 
pregnant women.  In addition, children in out-of-home placement, state 
custody, or living in residential settings may lack caretakers who will 
protect and advocate for their needs with the same degree of fierce 
devotion as parents, leaving them exposed to ethical and legal inequities, 
in addition to the medical dangers posed by the pandemic. 
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7. A range of expertise was desirable. Pandemic disaster expertise is rare, 
and when it does exist is usually focused on disease process and 
containment and rarely on psychosocial effects of and responses to 
pandemic. Thus, experts from related domains (e.g., behavioral health, 
pediatric disaster, infectious disease, public health) were included. 
Expertise was recognized as potentially emerging from formal and 
informal paths of training and experience and the expert database 
included political appointees, new hires and lifelong civil servants, 
government and nongovernment employees, on-the-ground service 
providers, and citizens of all ages. Relevant experience was dictated by 
the indeterminate realities of pandemic disease and the probabilistic 
nature of planning and response. In this situation, experts may include 
many persons who are not formally or officially labeled as such, but 
persons who offer valuable information. Therefore, this project has defined 
expertise across the spectrum and includes persons in positions of 
ultimate authority, those responsible for the vanguard application of 
policies and protocols, and the recipients of these procedures and 
processes. Also included are persons who have analyzed pandemic from 
academic and scientific perspectives.  Some of these experts hold 
simultaneous roles in diverse fields (e.g., a scientist who is also a public 
health official). Interview and focus group respondents were selected and 
assigned as key informants in a domain that best characterized their 
relevance to this study. 
 
8. A convergence approach was preferred. The process of data collection 
and interpretation was enhanced by using a variety of methodological 
approaches and assessments of convergence and dissonance of themes 
strengthened by variation and triangulation of research methods (Kuper, 
Lingard & Levinson, 2008).   The research process was guided by a need 
to verify emergent data by identifying areas of convergence across 
multiple study sites and methodologies.  Quantitative and qualitative 
methods in the form of surveys, focus groups and interviews, were all 
utilized in both the initial data collection and feedback stages of the 
project.  Examination of areas of convergence ensured that novel findings 
or phenomenon were thoroughly investigated.  Data collection, feedback 
and interpretation were intentionally iterative: emerging information was 
shared at regular research team meetings for verification and further 
investigation; field notes were immediately posted on a secure server 
accessible only to study personnel for review to inform subsequent waves 
of data collection from key informants; and interpretation of findings was a 
collaborative and inclusive process involving all team members.   
 
9. Confirmability required a broad range of sources and methods. The 
triangulation of methods approach was utilized to ensure that 
measurement bias was minimized and to enhance convergence of 
evidence across multiple methods and respondent groups.  Data were 
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collected from a range of different respondents and key informants 
throughout the sample area, and feedback was solicited from key 
informants with a broad range of experience and expertise.  This 
convergence of evidence across multiple methods and respondent groups 
enhanced the representativeness, reliability and validity, objectivity, 
potential replicability, and utility of the findings and evidence-informed 
guidelines.    
 
10. Research methods and tools were informed by the extant literature.  
Although a comprehensive review of the literature was conducted as the 
first stage of the project, this research area is relatively new and the team 
found it necessary to develop its own tools and approaches.  Wherever 
possible, standardized screens and instruments were included if they 
proved relevant and useful for the phenomena under investigation.  The 
process of measurement development respected standard requirements 
for psychometric construction found in social science research. For 
example, survey development included attention to question ordering 
effects, item exclusivity, and clear and consistent use of key terms 
(Sudman & Bradburn, 1988).  Focus group and interview questions were 
formatted according to recommended approaches, including the use of a 
semi-structured interview schedule (Ehrmann & Etter, 1997).  The 
development of the State Plan Review Template and the Professional 
Organization Standards Review were guided by standard content analysis 
guidelines.   
 
11. Consistency across domains, methods and researchers was 
preferable. Consistency in level of detail, content addressed, and 
presentation of information (language, terminology, matrices, etc.) was 
possible, while also enabling and supporting targeted approaches to 
different members of the sample. Experts and key informants were 
encouraged to review and provide feedback in their areas of knowledge 
and expertise first and foremost. Consistency in how each 
recommendation was presented, the manner in which feedback was 
recorded and documented, and the specific areas for rating the feedback 
was rigorously maintained.  
 
12. Confidentiality and anonymity were privileged as essential 
components of the data collection process. Participants in this study 
were involved in the data collection process in a way that is protected by 
human subject protection regulations and standards. All protocols and 
procedures were reviewed and approved by the University of Kentucky’s 
Institutional Review Board and all study personnel were required to obtain 
human subject protection training and certification. It is highly probable 
that these confidentiality and anonymity assurances enhanced the candor 
of the interviews and comments and the validity of the data collected. In 
accordance to the project’s Institutional Review Board guidelines, the 
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names, employers (where applicable) and specific locations of 
respondents have been disguised or omitted and will not be tied to future 
findings.  
 
13. Conceptual rigor was fundamental. The distinctive needs of specific 
populations, geographic regions and professional fields could not be 
comprehensively articulated in evidence-informed guidelines. Thus, a 
strong conceptual core that could be adapted as appropriate to the 
specific needs of individual populations, regions or professions was 
necessary to maintain and maximize translational utility.  
 
Project Phase 1 
 
Literature Review (Deliverable 5a: Best Practices Guidelines for Pandemic 
Disaster Response: A Social Behavioral Evaluation). A comprehensive 
literature review and content analysis of historical and contemporary empirical 
reports, accounts, policy studies, and research studies, analyzing extant 
knowledge relevant to the disease containment strategies including isolation and 
quarantine of children and families was conducted. (See Appendix D for 
additional information.) The review identified core concepts for pandemic 
preparedness and response, identification of relevant domains of inquiry, 
recognition of gaps in the literature, and identification of areas of related 
literature.  This document examined work in the areas of public health, social 
psychology, behavioral health, healthcare, and law and ethics.  Throughout the 
literature review phase, the research team met frequently to engage in 
discussion for the purpose of reductive processing to ensure the focus of the 
review and analysis remained on children and families experiencing disease 
containment strategies, to ensure that no area of significance was overlooked, 
and to inhibit any expansion of research domains beyond the bounds of 
feasibility and effectiveness.   
 
Toolkit Development (Deliverable 5b: University of Kentucky Behavioral 
Health Research Toolkit).  Drawing on the literature review, the research team 
conceptualized, constructed, and piloted a range of survey, focus group and 
interview schedules targeted for key respondents who were determined to have 
significant knowledge of pandemic experiences. Additionally, the team 
constructed content evaluation tools to assess existing preparedness plans in 
addressing the needs, particularly the behavioral health needs, of families and 
children.  These instruments were developed following a rigorous process of 
analytic reduction of the findings from the extant literature to critical domains for 
empirical investigation within the scope of the project goals.  The Research 
Toolkit was developed to: (1) identify and query officials who have important 
decision-making roles in implementation of disease containment strategies and 
have formal and informal evaluative knowledge about these events; (2) collect 
information from families and children who have personal experiences with 
pandemic response strategies and knowledge of the sequelae of those 
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experiences; (3) assess the perceived relevance of national and state level 
planning (as it relates to children and families); (4) extract data from existing 
documents to facilitate formal evaluation of the child-specific pandemic planning 
process across settings and sites; and (5) assess the function of systems of care, 
specific to children (e.g., schools, public child welfare, courts of justice) in 
quarantine or isolation situations.    
 
Expert Database (Deliverable 5c: University of Kentucky Best Practices 
Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response Expert Database).  The Expert 
Database was the result of the first phase of field work and documents the 
methods used to collect data, the expertise represented in the database, and a 
summary and description of all data collected. This database includes the 
experiences, knowledge and recommendations of a diverse set of 2,608 experts 
who provided information on a broad range of critical problems and concerns 
relevant to the psychosocial responses of children and families to pandemic.  
This dataset represents the findings from surveys, interviews, and focus groups 
from five U.S. states identified through the “follow the virus” method, as well as 
Kentucky, and select cities in Mexico and Canada.  In addition, the expert 
database includes several systematic content analyses of pertinent documents 
and records, including state pandemic plans and professional behavioral health 
organizations’ pandemic or disaster response guidelines.  (See Appendices A 
and B for description of expert database.) 
  
Report of New Evidence (Deliverable 5d: A Comprehensive Analysis of 
Pandemic and Quarantine Responses for Families and Children: Integrative 
Report of New Evidence, Preliminary Findings).  The fourth phase of the 
project continued the analysis of the Expert Database to more fully understand 
children’s experiences of isolation or quarantine, the decision processes 
implemented by key persons associated with these disease containment 
measures, and lessons learned from the SARS epidemic of 2003 and the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic outbreak.  This report presents the results and analysis of the 
data collected on pandemic planning and response from professionals (public 
health officials, healthcare workers, behavioral health professionals, legal 
experts), consumer groups (families and children), and content analysis of the 
District of Columbia and all 50 U.S. state pandemic plans, the SARS Online 
Support Network, and a Professional Organizations Standards Review for six 
national behavioral health professional groups.  This extensive data collection 
process resulted in an understanding of broad and critical problems and 
concerns across diverse respondents and yielded important information about 
the responses of children, families and professionals to their experiences of 
pandemic, isolation, or quarantine, but no attempts were made to identify or 
portray cause-and-effect relationships, or to generalize beyond the sample 
parameters.   
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Response from the Field on Findings and Recommendations (Deliverable 
5e: New Directions in Pandemic Response: A Roadmap to Resilience).   
Based on findings from extensive fieldwork and data collection in the U.S., 
Mexico, and Canada, preliminary evidence-based recommendations were 
drafted to address the current deficits in child-focused pandemic planning and 
response and provide testable guidelines for successful quarantine and isolation 
that can be used to reduce the potential negative psychosocial effects of disease 
containment strategies on children and their families.  These preliminary 
evidence-based recommendations were subjected to national and international 
pilot testing and expert review to determine the utility and viability of the 
guidelines.  Results of the review are presented in Phase 2 (Deliverables 5g and 
5h) of the project. 
 
Project Phase 2 
 
Development of Best Practice Guidelines (Deliverables 5g and 5h: Best 
Practice Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: Response from the 
Field, Part 1 and Part 2).  Feedback from experts and key informants on the 
findings and preliminary recommendations comprised this phase.  The purpose 
of this “response from the field” stage of the project was to collect feedback from 
experts and key informants to confirm the understanding of the findings and 
interpretation of them into recommendations.  The feedback response phase 
included three components:  (1) feedback on the overall findings and 
recommendations from national and international level experts and stakeholders; 
(2) feedback from Kentucky stakeholders on the utility and relevance of the 
proposed findings and recommendations to identify the required adaptations and 
modifications for implementation at the state level; and (3) feedback from 
representatives of national professional organizations not previously queried.  
Emphasis was placed on understanding how general guidelines could be 
adapted for specific regions and Kentucky served in this project as the example 
of how this adaptation might be achieved.  (See Appendix G for instrument 
template used for feedback response.) 
 
Finalization of Best Practice Guidelines (Deliverable 5i:  Evidence –
Informed Guidelines for Child-Focused Pandemic Planning and Response). 
The final development of the Evidence-Informed Guidelines for Child-Focused 
Pandemic Planning and Response yielded the current document.  This is the 
culmination of the initial data collection phase, analysis and interpretation of the 
data, and two rounds of field-testing of findings.   
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Methods 
 
Multi-Modal and Mixed Methods Approach 
 
This project has been characterized by the consistent utilization of multi-modal 
approaches to data collection and analysis in all phases of study.  This mixed 
methods approach ensured opportunities to maximize ecological validity through 
inclusion of a range of sources of data, enhanced ability for convergence and 
confirmability of data across and among sources, and required a high degree of 
consistency across sources and respondents as well as among team members.  
The project was also characterized by an iterative and inclusive process that 
included review and input from all members of the team in every phase and at 
every step.  Further, the project valued and seriously considered the multi-
disciplinary perspectives offered by team members and respondents, and 
assumed that the exploratory nature of the study necessitated an evolving, 
responsive, flexible approach to the data and findings as they emerged. 
 
The mixed methods approach utilized both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to data collection and analysis through surveys, focus groups and 
interviews soliciting input in the form of ratings, multiple choice responses and 
open responses.   For example, in developing the measurement instruments for 
the Toolkit, the project team developed at least two methods for data collection 
so that convergent validity might later be evaluated.  This approach was also 
evident in the use of original and standardized measurement instruments.  While 
new tools were developed as needed, whenever possible existing standardized 
measures were utilized if they proved the most relevant and useful for the 
phenomena under investigation.  The mixed method approach utilizing survey, 
focus group and interview data was employed during all phases of field work, the 
initial data collection, and development of the Expert Database. It was evident 
and used across all types of respondents as well -- professionals in the fields of 
public health, healthcare, behavioral health and law and ethics, as well as youth 
and family consumers.  The mixed methods approach was also reflected in the 
initial and ongoing reviews of the relevant literature: a range of disciplines (public 
health, medicine, behavioral health, social psychology, law and ethics, 
government policy, etc.); types of literature (empirical studies, pilot studies, 
exploratory investigations, first person accounts, theoretical propositions, 
editorials, cautionary recommendations and practical guidance); sources of 
literature and data (academic journals, popular media, professional organization 
publications, public health information, government policy, case law, hotline 
transcripts, etc.) and different pandemic and disaster scenarios (SARS, H1N1, 
Avian Flu, natural and man-made disasters, table-top exercises, etc.) were 
examined with equal interest.   
 
Data analysis continued the mixed methods approach.  Descriptive analysis of all 
the data was conducted at every phase of the study to understand the number, 
type, demographic characteristics (age, gender, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic 
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status, etc.), geographical and professional distribution and pandemic exposure 
and experience of the respondents, as well as the distribution and description of 
the data.  As allowed, inferential statistical approaches were subsequently 
utilized. Qualitative data (e.g., field notes) were analyzed using standard 
categorization strategies.  Documents and websites were analyzed using 
standard content analysis approaches.  Data analysis generated findings that 
converged across multiple study sites and methodologies.  Findings with high 
levels of convergence were considered more significant than those with low 
levels. Generally speaking, when analysis revealed only a single source, this 
data was not utilized to generate a finding. 
 
The inclusion of the feedback response phase also incorporated a mixed 
methods approach.  Reactions to the preliminary recommendations by experts 
and key informants served to strengthen representativeness, reactivity, reliability, 
potential replicability of the findings (Miles & Huberman, 1994), and bolstered 
validity, minimized bias, and enhanced the practical utility of the 
recommendations.  The multi-modal process enabled the various elements of the 
recommendations as well as the various populations affected to be considered.  
Both quantitative and qualitative data were compared for convergence and 
dissonance. As with other stages of this project, the process continued to be 
iterative and inclusive, with all team members participating in all aspects of the 
work (planning, development of instruments, field work, documentation, data 
analysis and interpretation) and developing means for triangulating findings to 
facilitate critical review and confirmability (Farmer, Robinson, Elliott, & Eyles, 
2006).   
 
Standardization of Process and Content Components 
 
Standardization across phases, team members, respondents and types of data 
was accomplished in several ways. Toolkit instruments followed a similar 
structure, moving through various domains, asking similar questions in the same 
domain, and providing opportunities for quantitative and qualitative responses.  
Semi-structured interview schedules were used to guide focus group and 
interview discussions to ensure that all respondents from all disciplines were 
queried across a number of domains.   The domains determined to be most 
germane to the project goals following a reductive analysis of the extant literature 
included the following:   
 
 Behavioral health screening, assessment and service provision;  
 Psychosocial responses and experiences of children and parents to 
disease containment and pandemic;  
 Psychosocial responses and experiences of healthcare professionals and 
behavioral health providers to disease containment and pandemic;  
 Risk communication to children, families, professionals, and the 
community;  
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 Inter-disciplinary coordination and collaboration between public health, 
healthcare, behavioral health and emergency responders;  
 Legal issues, especially potential conflicts between parental rights and 
public health laws, regulations, and orders;  
 Ethical issues, with special attention to the planning for or achievement of 
just and fair outcomes in disease containment concerning families and 
children, especially those from vulnerable populations. 
 
Templates for field notes ensured inclusion of and attention to the same process 
and content areas across domains, disciplines, respondents and types of data. 
These tools were utilized to review documents as well with the development of 
the State Plan Review Template and the Professional Organization Standards 
Review, to guarantee standardization of review across documents and reviewers.  
In addition, all documents were reviewed by at least two team members and in 
areas lacking agreement, re-review was conducted until consensus was 
achieved.   
 
Standardization was also apparent in the approach to data collection during the 
initial and feedback phases.  Surveys were available online through 
SurveyMonkey© in order to standardize collection formats, provide a user-friendly 
format, and provide consistent presentation of the queries to respondents.  Paper 
surveys were a printed version of the online SurveyMonkey© instruments.   
 
The team devised a uniform approach for feedback collection as well.  Templates 
were developed for presentation of the preliminary recommendations via 
PowerPoint or webinar, or paper versions that could be used in person.  
Feedback instruments assessing recommendations were developed to include 
ratings and other quantitative responses, as well as qualitative open-ended 
responses.  A template for documentation of the feedback process was also 
created to ensure continuity of organization and level of detail of reported 
findings. This standardization allowed for maximum flexibility and efficiency in 
reaching expert communities and constituents in a variety of locales, 
environments and through a range of media to enable field work to occur through 
in-person, webinar and telephone presentations with individuals and small and 
large groups.  
 
Protection of Human Subjects 
 
All protocols, procedures and materials were reviewed and approved by the 
University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board (IRB).  Confidentiality and 
anonymity were privileged as essential components of the data collection 
process and reporting of findings.  All participants in this study were protected by 
human subject protection regulations and standards in accordance with the IRB 
requirements.  Findings were reported in aggregate whenever possible, and 
when not in aggregate, specific identifying data was omitted to preserve the 
confidentiality of the respondents.  Geographic locale, professional discipline or 
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level of expertise was reported only as necessary to inform the finding or 
recommendation.  All study personnel were required to obtain human subject 
protection training and certification in accordance with the University of Kentucky 
IRB standards. 
 
All participants were voluntary and agreed to consent for participation either by 
signing in person or by checking the “I accept or assent” box online (a waiver of 
signed informed consent was secured from the University of Kentucky IRB for the 
online surveys).  Consent required action be taken by the participant and the 
informed consent documents were all approved by the University of Kentucky 
IRB.   Several versions of the informed consent/assent documents were 
developed as needed for specific populations – professionals, parents and youth 
and persons speaking Spanish – and approved by the IRB.  Translation of the 
informed consent/assent into Spanish was completed with the approval of and in 
accordance with IRB requirements. 
 
Sample Phase 1 - Initial Data Collection 
 
Ecological validity was paramount and no a priori assumptions were made about 
the sample at any phase of the project.  A “follow the virus” methodology based 
on the intensity of the H1N1 pandemic for children was used to identify areas for 
study that experienced high rates of infection.  The “follow the virus” sampling 
strategy identified mortality and morbidity rates in North America based on the 
MMWR (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report) by the CDC.  Sampling criteria 
included the following rates for the first six months of the initial H1N1 outbreak 
(as of December 2009): 
 
• Highest number of pediatric deaths  
• Highest number of overall deaths  
• Highest number of confirmed cases of H1N1  
 
Based on this sampling strategy the following states were identified as target 
sites for data collection:  Arizona, California, Florida, New York and Texas (See 
Appendix E for more information).  In addition, Mexico was included for its high 
rates of H1N1 as the epicenter of the initial outbreak, and Toronto, Canada was 
included for its experience with the SARS pandemic.  Kentucky was also a target 
area, as it served as the pilot study site for the final phase of the project.  To 
maximize ecological validity, local knowledge and practices were given 
precedence over global definitions of population subgroups, and variations in 
culture were expected and respected.  While the five U.S. states identified from 
the “follow the virus” method were the focus of respondent recruitment, 
participants from all over the country were included if their experiences or 
expertise seemed relevant to the project goals.  
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Map of United States Sampling Sites 
 
 
Map of Mexico Sampling Sites 
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Map of Canada Sampling Site 
 
The initial sample of professionals was recruited using several methods.  Survey 
respondents in behavioral health and healthcare were invited to participate via e-
mail and postcard invitations using addresses obtained from purchased 
membership lists.  Electronic announcements and invitations to participate were 
sent from professional organizations to their membership after approval from 
their governing boards or executive committees.  Focus group and interview 
respondents in behavioral health and healthcare were recruited through the 
survey with a final question asking if they wished to participate in a focus group 
or interview. If so, they were directed to an unlinked form, where they provided 
contact information that project personnel used to facilitate a follow-up interview, 
either face-to-face or by telephone.  In addition, behavioral health, healthcare, 
public health and law and ethics professionals were also invited to participate in 
focus groups or interviews through direct outreach to identified experts in the 
areas of pandemic planning, disaster mental health, pediatric disaster response 
and public health.  A snowball approach was utilized and respondents were 
asked to identify others who might be interested in or appropriate for inclusion in 
the study.     
 
Parents were adults between the ages of 18 and 99 who had children ranging in 
age from birth to 22 years old.  Parents were recruited for surveys, interviews 
and focus groups through broad-based advertising in major newspapers (print 
and online) and through website advertising in all target areas.  Flyers recruiting 
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parents were e-mailed or hand-delivered to local health departments, schools, 
private and public medical offices, and distributed to attendees at professional 
conferences.  The Kentucky Division of Family Resource and Youth Services 
Centers also forwarded an e-mail invitation to parents throughout the state.  The 
same process was used to solicit volunteers who completed the survey and 
wanted to participate in a follow-up focus group or interview to talk more about 
their pandemic experiences.  At the end of each parent survey, respondents 
were also given the option of nominating their children for participation, and if 
interested, were directed to a separate form in SurveyMonkey© where they 
provided consent for their child to participate, and contact information for the 
child.  These youth were contacted via the e-mail address provided by their 
parents, and invited to participate. Youth in Juárez, Mexico, were recruited via 
outreach by the project’s cultural consultant who sent written information home to 
parents with students. Once parental consent was obtained, all youth 7-22 
provided an assent to participate at the beginning of each survey, focus group or 
interview.  
 
All participants, parents, youth and professionals, were eligible to receive a $10 
cash incentive upon completion of the survey, focus group or interview.   
 
Sample Phase II - Field Testing 
 
The sample for the feedback stage of the project was drawn from communities of 
expertise in the fields of disaster preparedness and response, children’s mental 
health, diverse communities, and vulnerable populations. Participants in this 
stage were included if they were probable consumers of the evidence-informed 
guidelines.  Informants from the original sample provided a check that 
interpretations of original findings were accurate; new informants provided a 
critical eye and additional perspectives on the original findings, preliminary 
recommendations and feasibility of implementation.  Two hundred fifty-four 
(N=254) experts and key informants from professional organizations and in the 
state of Kentucky were identified based on their roles and responsibilities in 
pandemic planning and response, as well as nominations from other informants.  
A snowball method was utilized at this stage as well to enhance identification of 
expertise in all relevant domains. A breakdown of the field testing sites and the 
number of interviews and focus groups conducted during this phase of data 
collection is included as Appendix F.     
 
The Kentucky sample provided insights to understanding the unique needs, 
resources and challenges of adapting the recommendations to a particular 
locale.  Kentucky respondents included parents and youth, and professionals 
from public health, disaster response, government hospital and medical health 
delivery, education, child advocacy and protection, business, law and ethics, and 
representatives of vulnerable populations, including minority ethnic populations 
and geographically isolated or geographically determined communities.  
Consideration of the particular needs of vulnerable children in the 
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Commonwealth was addressed via the inclusion of key informants from Kentucky 
counties with low ratings in child well-being and health indicators.  Vulnerable 
children were identified as those living in counties with high rates of child poverty, 
free or reduced meal eligibility, pediatric death, and poor overall citizen health.  
These indicators were measured based on data from the 2010 Kentucky Kids 
Count County Data Book (Kentucky Youth Advocates, 2010) and the Kentucky 
Institute of Medicine’s (2007) The Health of Kentucky: A County Assessment 
Report. Based on the findings, counties which were listed among the worst ten 
counties for three of the four indicators were identified as Lee, Clay, McCreary, 
Owsley and Wolfe.  Parents and youth living in these counties were particularly 
solicited for inclusion via outreach through the school-based Family Resource 
and Youth Service Centers.  
 
All participants in the field-testing phase of data collection were eligible to receive 
a $10 cash incentive upon completion of the survey, focus group or interview.   
 
Measures 
 
Instruments used throughout the initial period of data collection, as well as during 
the field response phases, were developed by the research team for the project.  
This development of the University of Kentucky Behavioral Health Pandemic 
Research Toolkit was a collaborative process with all members of the team 
contributing.  Areas of inquiry were determined based on findings from the 
literature review and noted gaps in the extant literature.  In keeping with project 
principles, the Toolkit focused on the needs of children and families so as to 
concentrate on behavioral health responses to pandemic, and to allow for 
convergence of data from multiple sources (interviews, focus groups, surveys 
and content analyses).  Domains for investigation were determined using a 
collaborative process involving a series of reductive analyses of findings from the 
literature review, justification for inclusion based on congruence with project 
goals and extensive discussion and review by the research team.  Standardized 
instruments were incorporated as appropriate to measure Post Traumatic Stress 
responses of children (Trauma Symptom Checklist for Young Children – 
TSCYC© and Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children – TSCC©) and their 
caregivers (Parent PTSD Checklist, Civilian Version  - PCL), and Secondary 
Traumatic Stress (Professional Quality of Life - R-IV) responses of behavioral 
health providers and healthcare workers.  The final instrument package was 
designed to be utilized by a range of audiences and populations in a variety of 
pandemic situations (e.g., H1N1 or SARS).  Instruments were adapted as 
needed for developmental needs (e.g., youth vs. adults), technical literacy (e.g., 
language used for parents vs. healthcare professionals) and language (Spanish 
vs. English) as well as pandemic circumstances (quarantine or isolation) and 
occupational locale (e.g., community-based or hospital-based).    
 
Surveys were translated into Spanish for use in Mexico and with Spanish-
speaking participants in the U.S.  Cultural consultation by Mexican behavioral 
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health professionals working in a border area ensured that the intent and 
meaning of the instruments were preserved through translation.  All instruments 
were field tested for intelligibility and respondent burden with a group of non-
vulnerable persons who volunteered and provided feedback using a separate 
instrument designed by the team.  Based on this feedback, modification to the 
tools was made to increase readability and cultural utility. 
 
The Toolkit included the following instruments by population (See Appendix C for 
complete listing): 
 
 Youth  
o Youth General, Isolation and Quarantine Surveys  
o Youth Pandemic Isolation/Quarantine Focus Group/Interview 
Schedules (Ages 8 – 18) 
o Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children © (TSCC, Ages 8 – 16)  
 
 Parents 
o Parent Pandemic General, Isolation and Quarantine Surveys   
o Resource Parent General Survey 
o Parent General, Isolation and Quarantine Focus Group/Interview 
Schedule 
o Trauma Symptom Checklist for Young Children (TSCYC) © 
o Parent PTSD CheckList, Civilian Version (PCL) 
 
 Behavioral Health Professionals 
o Behavioral Health Professional Pandemic Survey  
o Behavioral Health Professional Pandemic Focus Group/Interview 
Schedules 
o Professional Quality of Life – R-IV 
o Impact of Events Scale (IES-R) 
 
 Healthcare Workers 
o Healthcare Worker General and Pandemic Surveys 
 (Community-Based and Hospital-Based)  
o Healthcare Worker Pandemic Isolation Focus Group/Interview 
Schedules (Community-Based and Hospital-Based) 
o Professional Quality of Life – R-IV  
 
 Public Health Officials 
o Public Health Official General and Pandemic Surveys 
o Public Health Official Focus Group/Interview Schedule 
 
 Public Health Preparedness Planners (PHPP) 
o PHPP General and Pandemic Ethics Surveys/Interviews 
o PHPP General and Pandemic Law Surveys/Interviews 
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 Law and Ethics Experts 
o Law and Ethics Expert General and Pandemic Focus Group/ 
Interview Schedules 
 
 Pilot Testing Consumer Evaluation 
o Pilot Testing Consumer Evaluation Survey and Focus Group 
Schedule 
 
 State Plan Review 
o State Plan Review Tool 
 
 Professional Organization Standards Review  
o Professional Organization Standards Review Tool 
 
Instruments used during the field testing phases were also developed in a 
collaborative and iterative manner, reflecting the feedback provided throughout 
the process.  A template for field response was developed and adapted for each 
recommendation.  The instruments were then created to include the ratings 
relevant to the specific recommendations being considered by each respondent.  
The template included Likert scale ratings for each recommendation in three 
areas:  
 
1) The utility of each recommendation for their workplace or community,  
2) How much they believed it would improve pandemic response 
outcomes for children and families, and  
3) How realistic it would be to implement the recommendation.  
 
The Likert scale had five categories; strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree and strongly disagree.  Feedback instruments included space 
for comments and sometimes prompted comments with follow-up, open-ended 
questions about particular recommendations.  Respondents completed these 
ratings following presentation of the recommendations by PowerPoint, printed 
material or webinar.  Webinar participants responded via online polls (generated 
and delivered via WebExTM) following each recommendation.  As each 
respondent or group of respondents was presented with only the 
recommendations germane to their areas of expertise and knowledge, the 
configuration of the instruments utilized with each set of respondents differed, 
although the individual questions followed a consistent format.   
 
Analysis 
 
Descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were completed on the data as 
indicated.  All data at all project stages were analyzed for frequency and 
descriptive characteristics.  Initial empirical findings were analyzed using 
inferential statistical procedures as appropriate and indicated.  Qualitative 
analysis of field notes from interviews and focus groups, open-ended survey 
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questions, webinar polling answers and feedback responses was also conducted 
using standard categorization strategies identifying themes and areas of 
convergence and divergence.  Documents and websites were analyzed using 
standard content analysis approaches.  Again, triangulation of findings was 
sought across respondents, study sites, team members and types of data.  High 
levels of convergence were considered more significant than low levels and in 
general, if only a single source for a finding emerged after analysis, this data was 
not included in the findings and did not drive development of any 
recommendations.   
 
Regular team meetings, review of findings, field notes, analyses and write-ups, 
and collaborative field work encouraged and supported opportunities for 
exchange of ideas through shared interpretation of findings, exploration of 
alternative explanations, varied perspectives and unique expertise.  This 
exchange also facilitated the identification of areas of convergence and ensured 
an ongoing inclusive and iterative approach to the examination of the findings 
and development of recommendations.   Ongoing review of the literature 
continued throughout all stages of the study to identify emerging research and 
pandemic-related documents to continue to inform the systematic investigation 
and exploration of evidence about the biopsychosocial responses of children and 
families during pandemic.    
 
Written Documents Produced to Date 
 
Each phase of the study has produced a final report, documenting in detail the 
process and findings for that phase.  The documents produced to date that 
culminate in the development of Evidence-Informed Guidelines for Child-Focused 
Pandemic Disaster Planning and Response are as follows: 
 
1. Best Practices Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: A Social 
Behavioral Evaluation. A Comprehensive Analysis of Pandemic and 
Quarantine Responses for Families and Children (September 2009) 
2. University of Kentucky Behavioral Health Pandemic Research Toolkit: An 
Analysis of the Child and Family Experience (November 2009) 
3. University of Kentucky Best Practices Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster 
Response Expert Database, Phase 1 (July 2010) 
4. A Comprehensive Analysis of Pandemic and Quarantine Responses for 
Families and Children: Integrative Report of New Evidence (Preliminary 
Findings) (August 2010) 
5. New Directions in Pandemic Response: A Roadmap to Resilience (August 
2010) 
6. Best Practice Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: Response 
from the Field (Part 1) (December 2010) 
7. Best Practice Guidelines for Pandemic Disaster Response: Response 
from the Field (Part 2) (March 2011) 
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Appendix A 
  Expert Database:  Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews 
 
 
 
Role 
 
 
 
Survey 
Respondents 
 
Focus Group 
Participants 
 
Interview 
Participants 
 
Total 
Public Health 
Officials 
151  27 69 247 
Healthcare 
Professionals 
653 54 29 736 
Behavioral 
Health 
Professionals 
705 19 26 750 
Law and Ethics 
Experts 
------ 66 16 82 
Parents 596 ----- 4 600 
Youth  156 6 6 168 
Other  25  25 
Total 
Participants 
in Study 
 
 
2261 
 
 
197 
 
 
150 
 
 
2608 
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Appendix B   
Demographic Description of Expert Database 
 
 
Gender   N Percentage 
   Female 1855 71.1% 
   Male   692 26.5% 
   Unknown     61   2.4% 
 State or Country   
  Arizona 136   5.2% 
  California 273 10.5% 
  Florida 228   8.7% 
  Kentucky 565 21.7% 
  New York 293 11.2% 
  Texas 453 17.4% 
  Other state 284 10.9% 
  Canada 129   4.9% 
  Mexico 247   9.5% 
Race   
  White 1693 64.9% 
  African-American   229   8.8% 
  Asian     76   2.9% 
  Indian/Alaska     12     .4% 
  Hawaiian/Pacific Islander       5     .2% 
  Hispanic   359 13.8% 
  Multiple       5     .2% 
  Other     26   1.0% 
  Unknown   203   7.8% 
Population Subgroup   
  Behavioral Health  750 28.8% 
  Healthcare Worker  736 28.2% 
  Public Health 247 9.5% 
  Law and Ethics/Multidisciplinary    82 3.1% 
  Other 25 1.0% 
  Parents  600 23.0% 
  Youth  168   6.4% 
Total Participants 2608  
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Appendix C 
Tools/ Instruments by Population Category  
 
Population Instrument 
 
Behavioral Health 
Professionals  
 
Behavioral Health Professional Pandemic Survey  
Behavioral Health Professional Pandemic 
Interview/Focus Group  
Professional Quality of Life – R-IV (ProQOL – R-IV)  
Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R) 
Healthcare Workers 
 
Healthcare Worker General and Pandemic Surveys 
(Community-Based and Hospital-Based) 
Healthcare Worker Pandemic Isolation 
Interview/Focus Group (Community-Based and 
Hospital-Based) 
Professional Quality of Life – R-IV (ProQOL – R-IV) 
Law and Ethics Experts 
 
Law and Ethics Expert General and Pandemic 
Interview/Focus Group Schedules  
Pilot Testing Consumer 
Evaluation 
Pilot Testing Consumer Evaluation Survey/Focus 
Group Schedule 
Public Heath Officials 
 
Public Health Official General and Pandemic Surveys 
Public Health Official Interview/Focus Group Schedule 
Public Health 
Preparedness Planners 
(PHPP) 
PHPP General and Pandemic Ethics 
Surveys/Interview Schedules 
PHPP General and Pandemic Law Surveys/Interview 
Schedules 
Parents 
 
Parent Pandemic General, Isolation and Quarantine  
Surveys 
Resource Parent General Survey 
Parent General, Isolation and Quarantine 
Interview/Focus Group Schedules 
Parent PTSD Checklist- Civilian Version (PCL) 
Trauma Symptom Checklist for Young Children© 
(TSCYC) 
Professional 
Organization Standards 
Review 
Professional Organization Standards Review Tool 
State Pandemic Plan 
Reviews 
State Pandemic Plan Review Tool 
Youth 
 
Youth Pandemic General, Isolation and Quarantine 
Surveys  
Youth Pandemic Isolation/Quarantine Interview/Focus 
Group Schedule 
Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children©  
(TSCC, Ages 8-16) 
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Appendix D 
Key Documents Reviewed 
 
 
Documents Reviewed and Evaluated 
 
Over the course of this project, over 1,200 relevant documents have been examined.  A 
broad range of resources were analyzed from a plethora of domains.  Some examples 
are listed below. 
 
 
Examples of the types of documents reviewed include, but are not limited to: 
 
• National pandemic preparedness plans  
• State-level pandemic preparedness plans (50 states and the District of 
Columbia)  
• Peer-reviewed academic articles and reports in the fields of medicine, public 
health, behavioral health, social sciences, law, and ethics  
• Books and book chapters  
• Official and governmental publications (e.g., Commission Reports, Agency 
Reports, Public Policies and Protocols, Recommended Guidelines, Research 
Findings) 
• White papers  
• Conference proceedings and papers  
• Newspaper and magazine articles (features, fact pieces, opinion pieces, etc.) 
• Working papers  
• Relevant databases 
• Using EBSCOhost, OVID, or WebSPIRS, the following databases were 
searched: 
• Academic Search Premier, 
• America: History and Life  
• CINAHL 
• Cochrane Databases 
• Communication and Mass Media Complete 
• ERIC 
• Health Source –Consumer Edition 
• Historical Abstracts 
• MEDLINE 
• Newspaper Source 
• Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection 
• PsychINFO 
• Sociological Collection 
• TOPICsearch 
• Google and Google Scholar were also used as search engines 
• Web sites and internet forums, including online support groups and resources 
such as 
• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Website (www.flu.gov or 
www.pandemicflu.gov) 
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• Ready America (www.ready.gov) 
• SARS Support Centre (http://www.sarssupportcentre.net/) 
• Hastings Center Bioethics Forum 
(http://www.thehastingscenter.org/bioethicsforum/default.aspx) 
• Law and Ethics Documents including  
• Case law  
• Court decisions 
• Federal and State Legislation  
• Disaster Response Organization Documents and Websites: 
• American Red Cross 
• Department for Homeland Security (DHS) Disaster Preparedness Centers 
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
• National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) 
• Health Organization Documents, including 
• Trust for America’s Health 
• United Nations documents 
• Professional Organizations Documents and Standards of Care  
• American Academy of Pediatrics 
• American Medical Association  
• American Psychological Association  
• Council on Social Work Education 
• National Association of School Psychologists 
• National Association of School Social Workers 
 
Areas for Inquiry include but are not limited to the following domains, 
organizations and entities:   
 
• Public Health and Pandemic-Related Policy, Documents and Literature: 
• State Pandemic Plans United States) 
• Provincial Pandemic Plans (Canada) 
• Public Health Pandemic Plans (City, County and Regional Level Plans) 
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
• Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC)  
• Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) 
• Building Community Resilience for Children and Families  
• Mental Health Workgroup  
• Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
• Association for State and Territorial Organizations (ASTO) 
• National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
• US Department for Heath and Human Services (DHHS) 
• Office of Minority Health (OMH) 
• Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
• Homeland Security Council 
• Public Health Agency of Canada -- Center for Infectious Diseases 
Prevention and Control (CIDPC)  
• State-level  
• Helping to Heal: Behavioral Health Planning and Response to Public 
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Health Emergencies (Virginia) 
• Emergency Preparedness Oversight Council, Vulnerable 
Populations Workgroup (Arizona) 
• Community Conversations on H1N1 Vaccine: A Public Engagement 
Project Conducted by Public Health Seattle and King County 
(Washington)  
• City-level 
• County-level 
• Other  
• International Pandemic Planning and Response documents including, but not 
limited to those by  
• World Health Organization (WHO)  
• United Nations  
• World Bank  
• National Collaborating Centre for Methods and Tools (Canada) 
• Public Health and Healthcare Literature, Documents and Guidelines 
• Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) 
• Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP)/Promising 
Practices: Pandemic Influenza Tools 
• National Association of City and County Health Organizations (NACCHO) 
• Center for the History of Medicine (CHM) University of Michigan Medical 
School 
• Behavioral Health Literature, Documents and Guidelines 
• Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) 
• Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress (CSTS) 
• National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN) 
• Professional BH Organizations Documents and Standards of Care: 
• American Psychological Association  
• Council on Social Work Education 
• National Association of School Psychologists 
• National Association of School Social Workers 
• Social Sciences Literature including Social Psychology, Social Work, etc. 
• Law and Ethics Literature including Case Law, Court Decisions 
• Health Lawyers Public Information Series 
• University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics  
• Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Federal and State 
Quarantine and Isolation Authority 
• National Academy of Sciences Workshop: Ethical & Legal Considerations 
in Mitigating Pandemic Disease 
• Disaster-Focused Commissions and Agency Documents and Guidelines 
• National Commission on Children and Disasters 
• National Consensus Panel on Emergency Preparedness for Racially and 
Ethnically Diverse Communities 
• The SARS Commission 
• National Biodefense Science Board – Disaster Mental Health 
Subcommittee 
• Disaster-Focused Scientific Research  
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• Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning through the Eyes of the Public 
• Consumer/Patient Memoirs 
• Pandemic Influenza Storybook 
• SARS memoirs 
• Disaster Response Organization Documents and Websites 
• American Red Cross 
• Department for Homeland Security (DHS) Disaster Preparedness Centers 
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
• National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) 
• Center for Biosecurity of UPMC 
• Emergency Medical Services for Children (EMSC) 
• Center for Public Health Readiness and Communication at Drexel 
University 
• Professional organizations documents and standards of care  
• American Academy of Pediatrics 
• American Medical Association  
• American Psychological Association 
• American Public Health Association  
• Council on Social Work Education 
• National Association of School Psychologists 
• National Association of School Social Workers 
• National Association for School Nurses 
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Appendix E 
National Field Testing Sample 
 
 
Target Groups 
Part 1 
Sector/  
Discipline/  
Profession  
 
Method  
Region/ 
Geographic 
Area  
 National behavioral health  
Disaster/terrorism  
Interview  All regions  
 National behavioral health  
Trauma related  
Presentation and 
feedback  
All regions  
 National behavioral health  
Disaster/terrorism 
Interview  All regions 
 Public health –  
National disease control 
Focus Group  All regions  
 Healthcare expert systems of care  Interview  All regions  
 Children’s healthcare  
Disaster focus 
Focus Group  All regions  
 Child Life specialists  Focus Group  All regions  
 Healthcare and public health expert  Interview 
(webinar)  
All regions  
 Healthcare, behavioral health,  
parents, children and vulnerable 
groups  
Focus Group 
(webinar)  
California  
 Parents, children, vulnerable groups  Focus Group  All regions  
 Law and ethics center Interview  Canada  
 Hispanic healthcare, parents, children 
and vulnerable groups  
Focus Group  
(webinar)  
All regions  
 Public health -  
Well-designed preparedness plan  
Interview  Washington  
 Public health -  
National organization 
Interview  Canada 
 Public health -  
Infection control 
Presentation and 
survey  
All regions  
 Law and ethics - 
Public health  
Interview 
(webinar)  
All regions  
 Behavioral health providers Focus Group  All regions  
 Public health professionals Presentation and 
discussion  
All regions  
 Public health organization Interview and/or 
Focus Groups 
Mexico 
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Target Groups 
Part 2 
Sector/ 
Discipline/ 
Profession  
 
Method  
Region/ 
Geographic 
Area 
 
Consumers  
 
 Parents  Focus Groups (5)  Kentucky  
 Youth  Focus Groups (2)  Kentucky  
 Children and families in communities  Interview  Kentucky  
 Children and families in communities  Focus Groups (4) 
(face-to-face and 
webinar)  
Kentucky  
 Behavioral health consumers – 
Advocacy organization  
Interview  Kentucky  
 
Diverse Populations 
  
 Vulnerable populations –  
City government 
Interview  Kentucky  
 
Schools  
 
 School disaster response –  
School safety organization 
Interview  Kentucky  
 
First Responders  
 
 National community disaster response  Interview  All regions  
 National pediatric disaster response  Interview  All regions  
 Community crisis response  Interview  Kentucky  
 Pediatric disaster response  Interview  Kentucky  
 
Community and Faith-Based Organizations  
 
 National faith-based disaster 
response  
Focus Group 
(webinar)  
All regions  
 State faith-based disaster response  Interview  Kentucky  
 
Public Health  
 
 Public health  Interview  Kentucky  
 Public health –  
Preparedness planning officials 
Focus Groups (2) Kentucky  
 
Healthcare  
 
 Hospital disaster response – Hospital 
professional interest group 
Focus Groups (2) 
(webinar)  
Kentucky  
 Hospital and community disaster 
response – Health preparedness 
Focus Groups (2) 
(webinar)  
Kentucky  
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Professional Groups  
 
 National behavioral health 
organization – all disciplines 
Interview  All regions  
 National behavioral health 
organization – Social Work 
Interview  All regions  
 National behavioral health 
organization - Psychology 
Interview  All regions  
 National behavioral health 
organization - Pediatrics  
Interview  All regions  
 National behavioral health 
organization - Psychiatric Nursing 
Interview  All regions  
 National pediatric health organization Focus Group 
(webinar)  
All regions  
 Behavioral health – marriage or family 
therapy 
Interview  State  
 
Business  
 
 Community crisis response – 
Business guild 
Interview  Kentucky  
 
Legal and Ethical  
 
 National legal issues – Court system Interview  All regions  
 Kentucky legal issues - Judiciary Interview  Kentucky  
 65 
 
 
 
 66   
 
Appendix F 
State and National Field Testing Sample 
 
 
State 
 
Interview 
 
Focus Groups 
 
Webinar 
AZ  
 
1 group,  
6 participants 
 
 
CA 
1 1 group,  
2 participants 
1 webinar,  
15 participants 
 
CO 
 1 group,  
19 participants 
 
 
DC 
 
4 
2 groups,  
16 participants 
1 webinar,  
4 participants 
 
GA 
 
 
2 groups,  
22 participants 
 
 
MI 
 
1 
  
 
NY 
 
1 
3 groups,  
24 participants 
 
 
OK 
 
1 
  
 
TO 
 
1 
  
 
VA 
 
1 
  
 
 
WA 
 
1 
  
 
KY 
Breathitt, Carlisle, Clay, 
Fayette, Floyd, Franklin, 
Fulton, Hopkins, 
Jefferson, Laurel, 
Madison, Magoffin, 
Muhlenberg, Murray, 
Ohio, Owsley, Perry, 
Pike, Pulaski, and Warren 
Counties   
 
11 
 
10 groups,  
86 participants  
(57 parents, 9 youth, 
20 professionals)  
 
3 webinars,  
17 participants 
 
 
U.S. States 
(miscellaneous) 
   
3 webinars,  
21 participants 
 
Total 
 
22 
 
20 groups,  
175 participants  
 
8 webinars,  
57 participants 
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Appendix G   
Instrument Template Utilized for Feedback Response from the Field 
 
 
Responses from the field were sought to review of preliminary recommendations by a 
range of experts, professionals and consumers, throughout the country.  These reviews 
occurred during individual interviews, focus groups and webinars.  Preliminary 
recommendations were presented as written documents, PowerPoint presentations or 
webinar presentations and respondents provided feedback via discussion and response 
using a rating instrument.  The presentation and rating instrument was adapted for each 
respondent based on domain of expertise and experience, but utilized the same 
materials to ensure consistency of presentation across domains and respondent 
populations.  Webinar participants responded using an online polling system with the 
same content as written or online tools.  All participants consented to participation in 
research via signature or online acceptance of the consent form.   
 
Feedback instruments were all called The Behavioral Health Impact of Pandemic on 
Children and Families:  Some Preliminary Recommendations and included a 
standardized format for every recommendation.  The recommendation was summarized 
and respondents were asked to rate the need, viability and benefit to children of the 
recommendation in their community or sphere of functioning.  The rating scale utilized a 
Likert scale of degree of agreement and was presented as follows after each 
recommendation:   
 
 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly  
Disagree  
 
There is a need for this in my 
community  
     
 
This is a realistic strategy for my 
community 
     
 
This will improve care for 
children and families 
     
 
 
Instructions for the rating tool read as follows:   
 
Please provide a rating and your initial impressions.  Your opinions will help us 
shape the recommendations we will submit to the National Institute of Hometown 
Security.   
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Recommendations were summarized as follows, each with the rating scale following the 
statement.  Not all recommendations were presented to all respondents. 
 
 
Pandemic Preparedness Communication and Collaboration: 
 
1. Create the role of child-focused pandemic boundary spanner to coordinate a 
community network to address the needs of youth and families during pandemic 
disaster.   
 
Tell us what you think about the idea of a boundary spanner and pandemic 
network?  Is the network a good idea?  Is a boundary spanner necessary for the 
network to succeed?  Will it work?  What is needed to make it work?  What might 
get in the way of it working? 
 
 
Behavioral Health: 
 
2. Include behavioral health screening of youth and families by trained 
professionals as a routine component in all pandemic response protocols (e.g., in 
clinics, hospitals, doctors’ offices, public health departments), peri- and post-
pandemic, utilizing an integrated care model. 
 
3. Develop strategies for identification and utilization of evidence-based 
behavioral health assessment and intervention protocols.    
 
4. Support behavioral health screening by professionals most suited to the role, 
(e.g., child life specialists and social workers in hospitals, pediatricians and primary 
care providers in outpatient settings), and provide adequate training and updates in 
recommended protocols.   
 
5. Support protocols requiring follow-up behavioral health screening of family 
members of patients who screen positive for pandemic-induced behavioral health 
stress responses and follow-up for anyone meeting traumatic stress response 
levels.  
 
6. Include and support reimbursement for alternative ways of delivering mental 
health and human services to youth and families during pandemic, (e.g., using 
web-cam, telephone, internet communication) in place of face-to-face meetings. 
 
      What types of technology would you like to see used for delivery of mental 
health or human services if face-to-face is not available?   What would the 
challenges be to using those technologies?   
 
7. Ensure the biopsychosocial needs of children and families during pandemic are a 
part of the national agenda:  
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 include strategies to address the behavioral health and human services needs of 
families and children during pandemic in the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework  
 include pandemic preparedness in the Concept of Operations component of 
disaster mental health if adopted by Congress.  
 
8. Include the behavioral health needs and responses of children and families during 
pandemic in the national research agenda of children’s mental health.   
 
9. Require state pandemic plans to have a Behavioral Health Appendix to include:  
 requirements for psychoeducational information for parents and youth 
 resources for families and children 
 clearly outlined and pre-determined behavioral health screening strategies 
 use of evidence-informed and protocol driven assessment and intervention 
approaches, and  
 development and utilization of child-focused pandemic boundary spanner. 
 
10. Support a coordinated and collaborative approach to pandemic preparedness by 
professional organizations to:  
 develop guidelines and standards of care for biopsychosocial needs of children 
and families 
 identify roles and responsibilities during pandemic 
 develop contractual agreements with disaster gatekeepers 
 specify educational and training competencies for pandemic disaster responders  
 develop ethical guidelines for pandemic response to children and families. 
  
 
Risk Communication: 
 
11. Make sure pandemic messages and communication are child-focused, family-
targeted, developmentally appropriate and culturally sensitive. 
 
12. Include input from special and vulnerable populations in risk communication 
development and pretest messages with special and vulnerable populations.   
 
13. Feature and include input from pediatricians and other primary care providers in 
developing effective peri- pandemic risk communication and messages   
 
14. Utilize existing community structures, including schools, for communication of 
information and ensure community-targeted messages minimize potential for stigma. 
 
 
Professional Risk Communication/ Information Dissemination:   
 
15. Promote professional communication that is timely, evidence-based, utilizes a 
“push” methodology and utilizes a range of media.   
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Family-Centered and Continuity of Care for Children and Families: 
 
16. Promote family-centered care and responses for pandemic planning to keep 
families together as much as possible including during periods of hospitalization, 
quarantine or isolation. 
 
17. Promote family-centered care with comprehensive pre-pandemic training of all 
pandemic first responders and medical responders, especially physicians, nurses 
and direct service medical providers.    
 
18. Promote continuity of care through advance training, cross-training and 
adequate staffing coverage plans (e.g., three-deep), especially in areas of 
specialty services for children (e.g., PICU, NICU, pediatric oncology, etc.).  
 
19. Establish, evaluate, and prioritize family-centered care practices for quarantine and 
isolation that maintain connection between child and parent. 
  
 
Family Support and Community Resiliency: 
 
20. Include strategies for meal distribution or food replacement of free or reduced 
cost meals for youth during periods of school or child care closure.  
 
21. Include strategies for job security or income replacement for work time lost due to 
pandemic (e.g., illness, ill family member, quarantined based on exposure, school 
closure, etc.)   
 
22. Include strategies to protect special populations from stigma or stereotyping.   
 
 
Professional Training, Support and Resiliency: 
 
23. Address psychosocial needs of pandemic responders through recommendations for 
 establishment of non-stigmatizing, non-punitive opportunities for individual and 
 group support and intervention for pandemic-related stress responses. 
 
24. Ensure mental health providers from different professional groups work 
together and work with other professionals to address the needs of youth and 
families during pandemic. 
 
25. Support a coordinated and collaborative approach to pandemic preparedness by 
professional organizations to:  
 develop guidelines and standards of care for biopsychosocial needs of children 
and families 
 identify roles and responsibilities during pandemic 
 develop contractual agreements with disaster gatekeepers 
 specify educational and training competencies for pandemic disaster responders  
 develop ethical guidelines for pandemic response to children and families. 
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26. Promote professional resiliency through:  
 availability of non-stigmatizing, non-punitive peri-pandemic behavioral health 
services for pandemic responders and their families 
 peri-pandemic outreach and education; regular professional opportunities for 
self-screening, peer assessment and supervisory screening 
 regular opportunities for individual and group support or intervention 
 collaboration with professional organizations, unions, work-place safety, etc.   
 
27. Overcome stigma directed at healthcare providers who care for those quarantined or 
isolated. 
 
28. Address healthcare provider anxiety re: “bringing disease home,” especially for non-
infectious disease healthcare providers. 
 
 
 
Additional comments on the preliminary recommendations:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your feedback! 
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Appendix H 
Recommendations for Brief Trauma Screening Tools  
 
 
 
 Child Instruments 
 
 Child Stress Disorders Checklist – Screening Form (CSDC-SF) 
 A four-item scale; assesses traumatic stress reactions in youth ages 6–18. 
 www.nctsnet.org/nctsn_assets/acp/hospital/CSDC-Screening%20Form2.pdf  
 
 Child Trauma Screening Questionnaire (CTSQ) 
 A 10-item version of the Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ), reworded for child 
 comprehension. 
 www.psid.org.au/.../Child-Trauma-Screening-Questionnaire-for-children.pdf 
 
 Impact of Events Scale – 8 (IES-8 or CIES) 
 An eight-item child and adolescent self-report scale; measures intrusion and 
avoidance responses to a specific identified event. 
www.childtrauma.com/chmies8.html 
 
Adult Instruments 
 
 Short Form of the PTSD Checklist – Civilian Version 
 A six-item screening instrument derived from the original 17-item PTSD Checklist-
 Civilian Version (PCL).  http://www.pdhealth.mil/guidelines/appendix3.asp 
 
 Short Screening Scale for PTSD 
 A seven-item scale, suitable for all ages, that contains five avoidance and two 
hyperarousal items. (This is a subset of items from the DIS/Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview PTSD section). 
 http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/assessments/short-screen-ptsd.asp 
 
 PTSD-8 
 An eight-item tool derived from the first 16 items of the Harvard Trauma 
Questionnaire (HTQ) and assesses both DSM-IV symptoms  and culture-specific 
symptoms associated with PTSD. 
www.benthamscience.com/open/cpemh/articles/V006/101CPEMH.pdf 
 
 Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ) 
 A 10-item screener created to use with survivors of a variety of traumatic stressors.  
It is based on items from the PTSD Symptom Scale-Self Report (PSS-SR) and 
contains five re-experiencing items and five arousal items. 
 www.completepractitioner.com/assessment/PSD.pdf 
 
 Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD) 
 A four-item screening scale designed for use in primary care  settings. 
 http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/assessments/pc-ptsd.asp 
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Appendix I 
Ethical and Legal Resources for Practitioners 
Planning and Responding to Pandemic Influenza:  Ethical Considerations Checklist 
This checklist was developed by the Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the 
Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and should be used by public 
health officials when developing or approving plans that will have a substantive impact on 
policy, practice or the public. It is intended to enhance ethical decision-making. Topics 
covered include general ethical considerations, and ethical issues relating to data collection, 
liberty limiting measures, and allocation of scarce resources.  The checklist is available at: 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/phethics/Pan_Flu_Ethics_Checklist.3-15-07.final.doc 
 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Law Program 
The CDC’s Public Health Law Program website includes material and links on the law of 
public health emergency legal preparedness. 
http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/ 
 
The National Action Agenda for Public Health Legal Preparedness 
The first national summit on public health legal preparedness sponsored by the Public 
Health Law Program at the CDC and 19 multidisciplinary partners.  Findings presented in 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2008, Vol 36:1) 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/Journalpdf.pdf 
 
The Centers for Law and the Public’s Health: A Collaborative at  
Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities 
A primary resource on public health law, ethics, human rights, and policy for public health 
practitioners, lawyers, legislators, judges, academics, policy makers, and others. 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net 
 
Public Health Law Checklists 
Together with colleagues at CDC's Public Health Law Program, the Association of State 
and Territorial Health Officials [ASTHO], and the National Association of City and County 
Health Officials [NACCHO], the Centers developed checklists on three major topics for use 
by public health agencies in assessing their legal preparedness for public health 
emergencies, including emerging infectious disease epidemics.  
Interjurisdictional Legal Coordination for Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/Checklist%201.pdf 
 
Local Government Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness and Response 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/Checklist%202.pdf 
 
Civil Legal Liability Issues and Public Health 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/Checklist%203.pdf 
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